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This Article explores the problem of public resource sales with
particular reference to natural resources managed by the federal
government. Lands owned by the United States hold trillions of
dollars' worth of natural resources. Federal agencies earn billions in
annual revenue from resource sales, yet critics assert that billions
more could be reaped if resources were sold for a fair price.
Although federal law has increasingly required that agencies price
resources at fair market value, this requirement is surprisingly
difficult to interpret and even more dfficult to implement and
enforce. This Article analyzes the various forces that bear on public
resource transactions and details the problems that continue to
plague these transactions, explaining why federal institutions are
commonly unable to satisfy the fair market value standard. It argues
that natural resource law should invoke procedural safeguards to
protect against he undue influence of incumbent resource users and
assure the public a fair return on resource sales. In so doing, it sheds
light on how public institutions deal in the marketplace and how
public ownership affects the value ofproperty.
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INTRODUCTION
The movement toward privatization is undoubtedly one of the most
important shifts in American governance in recent decades.' Debates about
I. For general analyses of privatization in the United States, see generally JOHN D.
DONAHUE & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE: PRIVATE ROLES FOR
PUBLIC GOALS IN TURBULENT TIMES (2012); PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY:
WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN
Do ABOUT IT (2007); Laura A. Dickinson, Privatization and Accountability, 7 ANN. REV. L. & Soc.
Scl. 101 (2011). Useful discussions of the global phenomenon are collected in PRIVATIZATION:
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privatization typically emphasize the "buy side" of the movement: the
contractual arrangements whereby governments outsource various functions to
private firms.2 The "sell side," the sale or lease of public assets to private
actors, is less frequently discussed but every bit as important-and every bit as
problematic. Governments sell physical assets, like land and buildings;
intangibles, like emissions credits and spectrum bandwidth; and even revenue
streams, like the right to collect tolls from roads or parking meters.4 Such sales
place a price on public assets-a price that is frequently too low.
It is not uncommon to learn that particular public assets have been badly
underpriced; indeed, entire programs have underpriced public resources on a
systematic and repeated basis.6 In countless instances, sales of federal realty
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES (G6rard Roland ed., 2008); see also Manuel Tirard, Privatization and
Public Law Values: A View from France, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 285 (2008).
2. Outsourcing of formerly public functions has expanded ramatically in recent years into
such domains as education, national defense and intelligence, infrastructure development, and
corrections and prison management. See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Jon D. Michaels,
Privatization's Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023 (2013) (identifying government service contracting as the
first and most common instrument of privatization).
3. See generally State-Owned Assets: Setting Out the Store, ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21593458-advanced-countries-have-been-slow-sell-or-
make-better-use-their-assets-they-are-missing (describing global trends in governmental privatization,
nationalization, and investment). Prior to the recent flurry of government outsourcing, asset sales were
the quintessential identifier of privatization. Daphne Barak-Erez, Three Questions ofPrivatization, in
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 493, 494 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010)
(noting that "[t]raditionally, privatization has been identified by the transfer of government assets ...
to private hands").
4. See generally Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1965 (2011); Matthew Titolo, Leasing Sovereignty: On State Infrastructure Contracts, 47 U. RICH. L.
REV. 631 (2013). Although in such instances governments are not selling assets per se, they are selling
the contractual right to receive streams of future revenue attributable to operations historically
undertaken by the government. Requests for bids from private entities can thus look very similar to
sales of public assets. More generally, please note that throughout this Article I use the term "sale" to
include less-than-fee relinquishments of public rights, including, for example, leases and contractual
rights. Where the distinction is analytically important, I use more specific language.
5. See, e.g., Lynne Bama, Wheeling and Dealing, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Mar. 29, 1999),
http://www.hcn.org/issues/151/4889 (describing, inter alia, a $763,000 sale of seventy acres of public
land near Lake Tahoe to a private developer, who resold the land on the very same day for $4.6
million); Wes Martin, Study: Indiana Toll Road to Cost Hoosiers In Long Term, IND. PUB. MEDIA
(Dec. 11, 2012), http://indianapublicmedia.org/news/study-shows-indiana-toll-road-cost-hoosiers-
long-term-41532.
6. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REP. NO. CR-EV-
BLM-0001-2012, COAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (2013)
[hereinafter INSPECTOR GEN. 2013 REPORT]; TOM SANZILLO, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN.
ANALYSIS, THE GREAT GIVEAWAY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES' LONG-TERM TREND OF
SELLING FEDERALLY OWNED COAL FOR LESS THAN FAIR MARKET VALUE (2012); U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-16, U.S. FOREST SERVICE: FEES FOR RECREATION
SPECIAL-USE PERMITS Do NOT REFLECT FAIR MARKET VALUE (1996). The problem is far from
unique to American government. See, e.g., Nancy Birdsall & John Nellis, Winners and Losers:
Assessing the Distributional Impact of Privatization, 31 WORLD DEV. 1617, 1629 n.9 (2003) (noting
that underpricing of state assets is a common means of ensuring "that the sale will go forward");
William L. Megginson & Jeffiy M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey ofEmpirical Studies on
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have been faulted for bargain-basement prices.7 In other cases, realty is
transferred into private hands via complicated transactions that obscure
whether public agents have received a fair value. State and local governments,
for example, often use nonstandard real estate deals to attract development and
business enterprise such as professional sports franchises.9  Numerous
economists have concluded that such transactions produce substantial net
losses to taxpayers in the long run.'0 Finally, "sales" of long-term concessions,
which have become a regular part of modern political life, are also often
panned as poorly negotiated deals that inadequately protect the integrity of
Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321 (2001) (reporting widespread underpricing in sales of state-owned
enterprises as evidenced by large share price increases in the first days after the sale).
7. A recent flap involving a spate of sales of defunct federal post offices is illustrative. Critics
alleged that the federal government was selling off historic landmarks, including old and elegant post
offices in the Bronx, New York, and Berkeley, California, for far less than a fair price. Concerns were
exacerbated when it was learned that he Postal Service retained a real estate firm whose board
chairman is the husband of a U.S. Senator. See Anna Hiatt, Congress Wants Delay in Selling of
Historic Post Offices Until Federal Report Is Completed, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congress-wants-delay-in-selling-of-historic-post-offices-
until-federal-report-is-completed/2014/01/20/52c5c50c-7f07-lle3-93cl-0e888170b723_story.html.
It is worth noting, however, that the federal government is also criticized for retaining unused
facilities for too long. See Devin Dwyer, Cleaning House: White House Eyes Sale of 14,000 Unused
Federal Buildings, ABC NEWS.COM (Mar. 3, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/white-house-eyes-
sale-14000-unused-federal-properties/story?id=13041776 (noting claims that maintaining vacant and
underused federal facilities costs taxpayers over $1 billion per year). Selling federal assets can be
procedurally burdensome. Thus, at times federal agencies seem stuck in a damned-if-you-do, damned-
if-you-don't situation. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-I 1-370T, FEDERAL REAL
PROPERTY: THE GOVERNMENT FACES CHALLENGES TO DISPOSING OF UNNEEDED BUILDINGS 6
(2011) (noting that the federal government's "ability to effectively dispose of its unneeded property
can also be hampered by its lengthy disposal process, which is legislatively mandated").
8. Olga Kaganova, Government Property Assets in the Wake of the Dual Crisis in Public
Finance and Real Estate: An Opportunity to Do Better Going Forward?, 35 REAL EST. ISSUES 31, 33
(2011) (noting that when governments offer land for private uses without an arms-length sales
transaction, the "full costs to taxpayers often remain unknown").
9. Efforts to lure or retain sports teams can feature a complicated mix of tax benefits, eminent
domain actions on behalf of the franchise, donated or below-cost public real estate, and public
financing of construction and operational costs. See, e.g., Erin A. Stanton, Home Team Advantage?:
The Taking of Private Property for Sports Stadiums, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 93 (2005) (analyzing the
legal issues that arise when government employs its power of eminent domain to provide real estate to
sports teams); Joe Guillen, Detroit Red Wings' New Stadium Land Transfer Approved by City Council,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://archive.freep.com/article/20140204/NEWS01/302040074
(documenting that he city of Detroit sold public land with an assessed value of $2.9 million forjust $1
to incentivize the construction of a new hockey arena); Aaron Kuriloff & Darrell Preston, In Stadium
Building Spree, US. Taxpayers Lose $4 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 5, 2012, 9:01 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-05/in-stadium-building-spree-u-s-taxpayers-lose-4-
billion.
10. See generally Reed Albergotti & Cameron McWhirter, A Stadium's Costly Legacy Throws
Taxpayers for a Loss, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405
2748704461304576216330349497852; Gregg Easterbrook, How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Oct. 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-
nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448.
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public services." These transactions are likely to come at a severe discount
because the government has a tendency to "borrow against tomorrow" by
selling off revenue streams at discount rates that are less favorable, albeit more
politically palatable, than traditional debt arrangements.12
The broader concern here, of course, is that the government is
mishandling public assets and satisfying its short-term need for revenue by
selling assets that either should remain in public hands or should fetch a greater
return. In essence, the common element in these circumstances is the charge
that the dollar value obtained does not capture the asset's true value to the
public. Thus, while the conventional discourse on privatization emphasizes the
proper degree of government intervention into private affairs,13 underpriced
sales of public assets raise almost the opposite concern: the possibility that a
small set of private entities are unjustly enriched by public transactions.14 The
existing laws that govern resource transactions, it would seem, may be
ineffectively guarding the public interest.
This Article explores the federal government's ability to reap a fair
market price for public natural resources. The United States owns nearly seven
hundred million acres of land, upon which are trillions of dollars of natural
resource wealth: enormous quantities of coal, oil, and natural gas; vast stands
of timber; untold deposits of minerals and metals; and much else. Every year,
federal agencies sell billions of dollars' worth of these resources to private
entities.15 These agencies, and the laws and regulations by which they operate,
are regularly criticized for selling these resources short.' In some instances,
11. See, e.g., John B. Gilmour, The Indiana Toll Road Lease as an Intergenerational Cash
Transfer, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 856 (2012).
12. "The upfront payments received by jurisdictions entering into privatization agreements ...
are, at best, the present value of what would have been future tax (fee) revenue. Rather than true
privatization transactions, it is more accurate to describe these deals as loans repayable out of future
governmental revenues.... Debt masquerading as privatization costs governments more than
conventional debt [because] governments are unlikely to borrow at rates as favorable as the rates they
would obtain when issuing conventional debt." Roin, supra note 4, at 1968-69 (internal citations
omitted).
13. Barak-Erez, supra note 3, at 494 (noting that "generally speaking, privatization aims to
reduce government intervention in social and economic life"). But note that in regard to privatization
as a global movement, the literature's principal frame is generally that of economic development. See
Birdsall & Nellis, supra note 6, at 1619 ("We take it that the main or ultimate objective of privatization
everywhere has been, or should be, to secure efficiency gains for the economy as a whole.").
14. Therefore, such transactions implicate not only issues of privatization, but also of rent-
seeking and public choice. See, e.g., Arye L Hillman, Rent Seeking, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO
PUBLIC CHOICE 307 (Michael Reksulak et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010) (noting that rent seeking persists even
after socialist economies shift towards liberalization and privatization).
15. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ECONOMIC REPORT FY 2012 (2013),
http://www.doi.gov/ppa/economicanalysis/economic-report.cfn.
16. For example, sales of federal land are routinely faulted for lining the pockets of local real
estate developers. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley & Griffin Palmer, Nevada Learns to Cash In on Sales of
Federal Land, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/us/031ands.html
(noting criticism from lawmakers and taxpayers who take the view that "the government gave too
much"). By way of another example, it is often claimed that federal timber sales do not cover their
1519
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these criticisms amount to a legal argument that resource sales do not conform
to a fair market value standard imposed by law.17 In other instances, the law
itself is faulted for inadequately protecting public resources from commercial
exploitation. In any event, the variety of natural resource transactions, and the
various issues they implicate, make this domain an important locus for the
study of governmental resource sales.' By examining federal agencies' natural
resource transactions, this Article explains why public agents are handicapped
in market transactions and what the law might do about it.19
The natural resource contexts reveal that, despite the law's frequent
invocation of a fair market value standard, publicly owned natural resources are
unlikely to produce a full market return for a number of reasons. Most
obviously, there are many areas in which Congress itself has simply chosen to
accept below-market prices, providing resource users with an implicit
subsidy.20 There are various justifications for such subsidies, but as this Article
costs. See Ross GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL32485, BELOW-COST TIMBER SALES: AN
OVERVIEW (2004); see also supra note 6.
17. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-140, COAL LEASING: BLM
COULD ENHANCE APPRAISAL PROCESS, MORE EXPLICITLY CONSIDER COAL EXPORTS, AND
PROVIDE MORE PUBLIC INFORMATION (2013) [hereinafter GAO 2013 REPORT] (detailing possible
legal defects in the Bureau of Land Management's coal leasing process).
18. The prices at which the United States sells its natural resources are important for a number
of reasons. They affect federal revenue, an obvious and perennial concern. They have environmental
repercussions to the extent that low prices encourage additional resource extraction and consumption.
And given the enormous extent of federal resource ownership, federal sales can shape the entire
market in a particular resource. For example, nonfederal owners of fossil fuels, whether private parties
or state or local governments, often find their market prospects shaped substantially by federal
decisions to sell (or withhold from sale) coal, gas, or oil, or to permit renewable energy development
on federal land. Additionally, simply offering a large quantity of an energy resource for sale or lease
may tilt national energy policy toward that fuel and away from others. Some analysts claim, for
example, that the perpetual availability of low-cost coal on western federal lands established coal s
the fuel of choice for energy generation during the 1970s and 1980s, a policy that continues to shape
energy production today. See SANZILLO, supra note 6, at 8.
19. This Article builds on the assumption that free market activity and government regulation
are not antithetical or zero-sum but, in many instances, symbiotic. See Steven Vogel, Why Freer
Markets Need More Rules, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY
REFORM 25, 28 (Marc K. Landy et al. eds., 2007) ("The government-versus-market dichotomy that
animates most debates about economic policy is [] misleading ... not simply because competition
requires regulation ... but because market competition is not incompatible with a substantial
government role ... beyond that of a referee.").
20. See infra Part II.C. Please note that this Article does not suggest that selling assets at a
price below their market value is uniformly undesirable. Historically, there have been numerous
instances in which government entities have deliberately sold assets below their market value for
purposes of public policy. Sometimes the objective was the promotion of settlement or development.
The most obvious examples here would be the Homestead Act and the mining rights granted by the
General Mining Law of 1872. See infra notes 117-18. Sometimes the goal was the protection of
certain industries. Forest Service timber policy, for example, was long concerned with sustaining
communities that had developed around timber harvesting and processing. Achieving this goal
entailed protecting such communities not only from boom-and-bust domestic markets but also from
international competition, especially from Canada. See generally DAVID A. CLARY, TIMBER AND THE
FOREST SERVICE 147-68 (1986). Thus the mere fact that private parties benefit from below-cost
purchases of public assets does not mean that the public is being cheated to benefit private actors. Even
1520 [Vol. 103:1515
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explores, it is also the case that incumbent resource users tend to wield an
outsized political influence. This influence, in turn, offers a clue to
understanding the operation of resource sales even in those contexts in which
Congress has demanded fair market value. Incumbents stand in a strong
position vis-A-vis resource management agencies on account of those agencies'
task environment and institutional structure. The federal land management
agencies-principally the U.S. Forest Service and the U.S. Department of the
Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 2 1 -oversee a vast amount of
land, and they do so at staffing and budget levels that make it difficult to fulfill
their legal mandates. Furthermore, federal law requires these agencies to
balance numerous public objectives and to sell resources only pursuant to
onerous procedural requirements that are not replicated in the private
marketplace. Lacking readily available comparables, government agents often
have little on which to base a presale estimate or asking price. In other cases,
federal ownership of a resource is so extensive that it virtually comprises the
entire market.22 To speak of, much less to legislate, a fair market value standard
in this context verges on incoherence.
In these conditions, incumbents thrive.23 This does not mean that the
American public is doomed to an inadequate return on its natural resources; nor
does it mean that asset sales programs should cease. The principal lessons of
this Article are that the law of public natural resources should better account
for the power of incumbent resource users by clarifying the goals of resource
management; when maximizing revenue is an important objective, the law
should rely on specified sales procedures rather than on abstract legal formulae,
such as "fair market value," which have little substantive or justiciable content.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I begins with a short case study
of federal coal sales to provide an example of a mature federal resource
program that benefits incumbent resource users. Part II provides an overview of
the federal government's natural resource policies, reviewing both the
today, some argue that renewable energy companies should receive free or below-fair market value
access to public lands. And "giveaways" of public lands for sports stadiums and the like are, of course,
intentional; though the valuation of such lands may be contested, public actors generally engage in
such transactions with their eyes wide open as to the value of the land at stake.
21. These two agencies together are responsible for managing nearly 450 million of the 633
million acres under federal ownership. The Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service
are next on the list, each managing over 80 million acres. See GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 32 (7th ed. 2014).
22. One of the giants of natural resources law, George Coggins, once noted:
"Fair market value seems largely a meaningless abstraction in the absence of a fair market. Where one
owner has half of the land, market forces, such as they are, will not operate freely." George Cameron
Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The
Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 75 (1982).
23. Throughout this Article, I use the term incumbents to refer to entities with long-term
transactional relationships with federal resource managers. Purchasers of natural resource rights tend
to be firms-such as mining companies, ranches, and timber harvesters-that are involved in repeated
purchases of rights from federal agencies rather than one-off transactions.
1521
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historical development of and current reliance on the fair market value
standard. This overview reveals that the federal government has always had
difficulty pricing its public resources, suggesting that today's problems are
systemic rather than circumstantial. Part III argues that the federal
government's pricing problems stem from the difficulties faced by limited
administrative institutions in managing enormous resource supplies in a context
in which longstanding private interests are well established in law, geography,
and local politics. This Part further argues that, although the influence of
incumbent interests is inevitable, carefully tailored sales procedures can
improve the quality of resource transactions. Finally, the Article closes by
outlining some implications of this analysis for theories of public property.
I.
THE CASE OF FEDERAL COAL LEASING
The United States is the record owner of enormous coal deposits in the
Powder River Basin, one of the richest coal basins in the world.24 Coal has
been mined from this region of Wyoming and Montana for decades, but
demand increased exponentially in the 1980s and 1990s. Not only is Powder
River Basin coal close to the surface, making it relatively inexpensive to
access, but it also tends to be comparatively low in sulfur content, enhancing its
appeal to power generators required by law to reduce sulfur emissions.2 5
Federal law tasks the BLM with holding competitive sales for coal tracts and
26
requires it to reject any bid below fair market value. Yet the Inspector
General of the Interior Department recently concluded that federal coal sales
27are leaving millions of dollars on the table. A parallel analysis by an
independent organization puts the shortfall into the tens of billions.28
24. See T.T. Taber & S.A. Kinney, U.S. Geological Survey, Land Use and Ownership,
Powder River Basin, in 1999 RESOURCE ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED TERTIARY COAL BEDS AND
ZONES IN THE NORTHERN ROCKY MOUNTAINS AND GREAT PLAINS REGION Fig.PM-2 (U.S.
Geological Survey Professional Paper 1625-A, 1999), http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/pl625a. The figure
displays mineral ownership throughout the basin and demonstrates that the federal government owns
the overwhelming majority of coal in the region. See also JAMES A. LUPPENS ET AL., U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ASSESSMENT OF COAL GEOLOGY, RESOURCES, AND RESERVES IN THE
GILLETTE COALFIELD, POWDER RIVER BASIN, WYOMING 1 (2008) (noting that coalbeds within the
Basin "contain[] the largest deposits of low-sulfur subbituminous coal in the world").
25. See BARBARA FREESE, COAL: A HUMAN HISTORY 178-79 (2003).
26. 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (2012).
27. See INSPECTOR GEN. 2013 REPORT, supra note 6.
28. See SANZILLO, supra note 6. See generally JEREMY NICHOLS, WLLDEARTH GUARDIANS,
UNDERMINING THE CLIMATE: THE POWDER RIVER BASIN OF THE WEST: KEY TO SOLVING GLOBAL
WARMING (2009); TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE, FEDERAL COAL LEASING: FAIR MARKET
VALUE AND A FAIR RETURN FOR THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER (2013); Mark Squillace, The Tragic
Story ofthe Federal Coal Leasing Program, 27 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T. 29 (2013).
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Let us begin by examining the process of federal coal leasing.29 As noted,
the law requires the BLM to reject any bid below fair market value.30 The
determination of fair market value, however, is committed to the discretion of
the Secretary of the Interior.31 Although the Secretary is required to solicit
public comments, he or she is not required to make public the assessed fair
market value.32 Accepted bids are made public, however, and occasionally so
are bids that are not accepted.33 On the basis of this information, outside
observers can draw some inferences about the Interior Department's internal
calculations of fair market value.
The Department's valuations-both the inferred fair value and the process
used to derive it-have come under heavy fire in recent years. An
environmental group released a report in 2009 that described the federal coal-
leasing program as a "sham."34 This was followed by several more detailed
reports by other nonprofit entities from across the political spectrum. These
reports, all sharply critical of the Interior Department's fair market value
determinations for coal, received substantial press coverage, attracted
37 .38
congressional attention, triggered several federal investigations, and sparked
29. A coal "lease" is not a lease in the way that property law generally uses the term. Instead, a
lease conveys a contractual right to remove coal from a base property according to the terms of the
lease agreement. See generally 4 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC
NATURAL RESOURCES Law § 38 (2d ed. 2013) (describing coal leasing practices before and after
adoption of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act).
30. 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1).
31. Id.; see also David A. Gulley, The Fair Market Value ofFederal Coal, 86 W. VA. L. REV.
741, 754 (1984).
32. 30 U.S.C. §201(a)(1).
33. See, e.g., Manuel Quifiones, BLM Rejects Wyo. Bid Deemed Below Fair Market Value,
GREENWIRE (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2013/09/19/stories/1059987536.
34. NICHOLS, supra note 28, at 16.
35. For white papers that describe in detail the lease by application process and its negative
effects on market competition, see SANZILLO, supra note 6; TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE, supra
note 28.
36. See, e.g., John Broder, Undervalued Coal Leases Seen as Costing Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES
(June 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/us/us-coal-leases-undervalued-costing-
taxpayers-millions-report-says.html; Manuel Quifiones, Coal Leasing Program Missed Out on Almost
$30B-Report, GREENWIRE, June 25, 2012; Manuel Quiflones, Taxpayer Group Slams Interior
Leasing Program, E&E NEWS PM (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories
/1059987470; Report Endorses Markey Low Coal Bid Charge, 37 PUBLIC LANDS NEWS 1, 10 (June
29,2012).
37. The House Natural Resources Committee, for example, held an oversight hearing in July
2013 concerning the western coal mining industry and raised issues related to the sale price of federal
coal. See Mining in America: Powder River Basin Coal Mining-The Benefits and Challenges:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Min. Resources of the H. Comm. on Nat. Resources,
113th Cong. (2013).
38. The U.S. Government Accountability Office and the Inspector General ofthe Department
of the Interior conducted the investigations. See INSPECTOR GEN. 2013 REPORT, supra note 6; GAO
2013 REPORT, supra note 17.
1523
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
numerous calls for reform.39 As a result, the House Natural Resources
Committee requested a report from the Government Accountability Office
examining coal-leasing practices, and the Interior Department ordered its own
investigation by its Inspector General.4 0 Both of these investigations yielded
reports released in the latter half of 2013.41 The remainder of this Part describes
the criticisms contained in these reports and explains why many observers
argue that the coal-leasing process does not result in fair market value
payments to the federal government.
The central criticism is simply that the coal-leasing process does not
create genuine competition. As a matter of law, leasing must take place by
42competitive bidding. A competitive auction is intended to yield fair market
value by definition, but there are several ways that auctions can fail to produce
this result, such as an insufficient number of bidders, inadequate information,
and collusion among bidders. There have been no charges of collusion in recent
years; instead, the current problem is structural in that the coal-leasing program
creates, as a consequence of its design, a shortage of participants in the bidding
process. For example, the overwhelming majority of coal lease sales in the
Powder River Basin in recent years have involved only one bidder.43 In such
circumstances, the lone bidder will be awarded the lease as long as the bid
exceeds the Interior Secretary's fair market value determination.
Why has there been only one bidder? The answer is in the details of the
leasing process. There are two ways that the BLM may initiate coal lease sales.
First, the BLM may designate a region as a "coal-producing region"; in such a
region, lease sales take place on tracts designated by the BLM and selected for
their marketability.44 Inexplicably, the BLM does not currently designate any
region of the United States, let alone the abundant Powder River Basin, as a
coal-producing region.45 Instead, the BLM relies entirely on the second
39. See, e.g., Mark Squillace & Tom Sanzillo, High Time To Reform the Federal Coal Lease
Program, IIEFA.ORG (Sept. 3, 2013), http://ieefa.org/high-time-to-reform-the-federal-coal-lease-
program.
40. See Letter from Edward J. Markey, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Nat. Resources, to
Gene Dodaro, Comptroller Gen., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (Apr. 24, 2012) (on file with
author) (requesting that the GAO create a report on federal coal leasing practices and providing further
background).
41. See INSPECTOR GEN. 2013 REPORT, supra note 6; GAO 2013 REPORT, supra note 17.
42. 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (2012). The only exception contemplated by the statute addresses
coal removal pursuant to rights-of-way granted under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (2012).
43. About 90 percent of BLM leases since 1990 have drawn only a single bidder. GAO 2013
REPORT, supra note 17, at 15. The remaining leases have only had two bidders. See INSPECTOR GEN.
2013 REPORT, supra note 6, at 8; Squillace, supra note 28, at 35 (noting that twenty-two of the last
twenty-seven lease sales in the Powder River Basin have attracted only one bidder).
44. 43 C.F.R. § 3400.5 (2012).
45. Squillace, supra note 28, at 35 (noting that "all of the historic federal coal production
regions in the country have been decertified"). In theory, the coal production region process would
govern lease sales in coal-rich areas and allow the BLM to design sales on terms favorable to the
federal landlord. The process was abandoned by the BLM in 1990, however, for reasons that remain
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allowable means of initiating coal lease sales-a process known in the industry
as "lease by application." In this process, coal firms nominate tracts of land that
46they would like to develop to the BLM. Over the years, these firms have
learned how to select tracts that are exceedingly unlikely to attract
competition.47 The most basic strategy is to propose tracts that are immediately
adjacent to a firm's existing mines.48 The firm incurs no additional startup costs
in developing such tracts and is at an advantage vis-d-vis a firm that would
have to initiate a new mining operation. Bidders can also manipulate the size of
the proposed tract. Usually, the bidder either keeps the tract small enough to
avoid attracting the interest of other firms 49 or fits the tract within an exception
to the competitive-bid requirement for lease modifications.50 Using these
tactics, coal firms can virtually guarantee their success in securing a proposed
lease.
To defend against such tactics, the Interior Secretary could simply set the
fair market value at a higher point. As the recent Interior Department Inspector
General's report suggests, however, there are several shortcomings in the fair
market value determination process. First, coal companies' own evaluations of
mining tracts serve as the basis for the Secretary's determination of fair market
value. This information is rarely verified by the Interior Department or an
independent party.51
Even assuming that the information provided by coal firms is accurate, the
BLM's method of calculating fair market value is problematic. The BLM relies
on internal appraisers rather than the Interior Department's appraisal office,
which has greater expertise in mineral valuation and less exposure to direct
industry pressure.52 As the Inspector General's report points out, this is a
violation of department rules.53 More importantly, BLM disregards export
potential in calculating value,54 despite rising demand for coal exports.5 It also
unclear. The lease by application process, described infra notes 46-47, has been used exclusively since
then. Id.
46. See 43 C.F.R. § 3425 (2012); see also Squillace, supra note 28, at 30-35. In either case,
BLM can place a tract up for auction only after completing market and environmental analyses.
47. Peabody Beats Alpha to Win PRB Coal Lease in Wyoming, PLATTS (July 13, 2011),
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/coal/washington/peabody-beats-alpha-to-win-prb-coal-lease-in-
6275925 (quoting Mark Squillace as saying, "These are bids that are being made on lease tracts that
were designed by an individual coal operator with a strong interest in avoiding competition").
48. Squillace, supra note 28, at 35.
49. See Peabody Beats Alpha, supra note 47 (quoting Mark Squillace as noting that
sometimes firms are "greedy and they want to take a little bit more than maybe they should" and thus
"end up getting a second bidder").
50. INSPECTOR GEN. 2013 REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
51. Id. at 12.
52. Id. at 6-7.
53. Id. at 6 (noting that BLM's procedure "does not comply with Secretarial Order No. 3300"
which was "intended to foster independence by taking responsibility for the valuation process from the
bureaus and placing it with [the Interior Department's Office of Valuation Services]").
54. Id. at 7.
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relies heavily on bidding results from previous sales,56 even though such sales
were themselves generally devoid of true competition. This method creates a
self-sustaining cycle of low bid values. In some instances, local BLM offices
even lower their fair market value determinations after the coal firm justifies its
original bid.57
Structural problems plague royalty collection as well. By law, the federal
government is to receive a royalty on any coal produced on federal land.58 The
law requires a minimum royalty rate of 12.5 percent.59 Yet, by consistently
setting the royalty at this point, BLM treats the rate as a maximum.60 Moreover,
firms can employ numerous payment structures to reduce the royalty valuation
base.61 Finally, site inspections are conducted by inspectors who "do not
presently have effective enforcement tools," according to the Inspector
General, and who often are assigned to the same mine for many years.62
These problems suggest that the current system of coal leasing is
structurally deficient: the leasing program's design and implementation result
in below-market yields on publicly owned coal. Although federal law requires
fair market value, the BLM has allowed coal-mining firms to minimize
competition, and the Bureau is almost entirely dependent on the same coal
firms for the information on which it bases its valuations. The situation is
virtually tailor-made for agency capture.63 Exacerbating these concerns, the
judiciary has displayed no inclination to second-guess the Secretary's fair
market value determination, nor has any court questioned the BLM's decision
to rely wholly on the "lease by application" process rather than the regional
55. Asian Power Demand to Drive Up Coal Prices, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/20/energy-coal-glencore-idUSL5NOJ51TE20131120.
56. INSPECTOR GEN. 2013 REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
57. Id. at 10.
58. 30 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2012); 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(a)(1) (2012).
59. 30 U.S.C. § 207(a). The regulations establishing the minimum royalty rate for surface
mining and underground mining authorize BLM to reduce this rate when doing so will encourage the
greatest ultimate recovery of federal coal, conserve federal coal, and promote development, or when
the lease cannot operate successfully under its current terms. See 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(a)(l)-(2). In no
situation, however, can BLM reduce the royalty on a producing federal lease to zero. Moreover, critics
have charged that royalties, just as lease bids, would be higher if BLM took Asian demand for coal
into account. See, e.g., Patrick Rucker, Prices Qf Coal Exports To Asia Not Reflected In Royalty
Payments, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_22125541/prices-coal-exports-
asia-not-reflected-royalty-payments.
60. 4 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 29, § 38:27.
61. See Isaiah T. Peterson, Devaluing Coal: Reasons for Restructuring How Federal Coal Is
Valued, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 165, 169-73 (2015) (describing take-or-pay contracts and other
mechanisms that allow lessees of federal coal to avoid royalty payments).
62. INSPECTOR GEN. 2013 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
63. The theory of agency capture "refers to cases in which a regulated industry is able to
control decisions made about that industry by regulators and/or performances by regulators related to
the industry." Barry M. Mitnick, Capturing "Capture": Definition and Mechanisms, in HANDBOOK
ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 34-39, 35 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011) (emphasis removed).
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approach more consistent with the letter and spirit of the law.64 The fair market
value standard encoded in the law, without more, gives courts very little basis
on which to scrutinize agency judgments, especially when the determination of
fair market value is committed by law to the Secretary's discretion. And as
some have noted, the market price of coal is itself influenced by the volume of
coal made available by the federal government, especially given the extent of
federal coal ownership. In such an environment, the concept of fair market
value, whether to courts or administrators, is of limited utility.
These problems are not unique to coal leasing or to the present era. Since
the Louisiana Purchase, the federal government has had difficulty alienating
coal reserves on terms satisfactory to both buyer and seller.65 For much of the
1800s, the federal government simply transferred coal-rich lands to settlers on
the same terms as other lands. While a windfall for fortunate or savvy settlers,
many lawmakers perceived this as a grievous mistake.66 As the fuel's
importance to industrial and commercial development became clear, Congress
raised the price of coal lands but had difficulty ascertaining an appropriate
67
price. In the early 1900s, federal policy shifted, and the government moved to
retain the remaining coal deposits. In 1920, Congress passed the Mineral
Leasing Act, which established the modem leasing system whereby private
entities could purchase mining rights to coal, rather than fee ownership of coal
lands.68 But this policy too was abused. Through the 1960s, speculators
stockpiled coal reserves in the western United States as a hedge against rising
oil prices.69 As a result, actual development occurred only haltingly; petroleum
prices remained low enough to make serious coal development on federal land
64. See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting a
challenge to the adequacy of an environmental impact statement evaluating a coal lease sale);
WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 8 F. Supp. 3d 17 (D.D.C. 2014); WildEarth
Guardians v. Salazar, 880 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that an environmental group did not
have standing to challenge a coal lease sale and demand that the Powder River Basin be recertified as a
coal production region). The only recent successful challenge to a coal lease sale dealt with a deficient
cost-benefit analysis for a mining exploration project. See High Country Conservation Advocates v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (D. Colo. 2014).
65. Here we can only glance at a long and fascinating history. See generally BENJAMIN
HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 512-28 (2d ed. 1965). Further
historical context will be provided infra Part II.
66. See HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 496-501 (describing Congress's increasing sense that
public lands required classification to safeguard supplies of timber, coal, and other resources).
67. Id.at518-19.
68. Act of Feb. 25, 1920,41 Stat. 437 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2012)).




unnecessary.70 Thus, as the energy crisis of the 1970s loomed, only a small
minority of outstanding federal coal leases were in actual production.71
Concerned by the gross disproportion between acreage leased and coal
produced, the Interior Department commenced an informal moratorium on new
coal leases in 1971. Congress eventually formalized the moratorium through
the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act (FCLAA) in 1976.72 Congress
intended the FCLAA to end speculation in coal reserves by requiring that firms
diligently develop coal leases and that BLM price coal at fair market value.73
However, the first substantial coal lease following the FCLAA-and the largest
coal lease sale in history to that point-led to an embarrassing scandal. Prior to
the sale, the Interior Department leaked its market value determination to coal
companies and then lowered the valuation in response to industry complaints.74
Federal courts refused to overturn the Interior Department's revised fair market
value determination, despite numerous investigations concluding that the sale
yielded $100 million less than the coal's true value.75 This episode signaled the
courts' unwillingness to play an active role in policing the fair market value
requirement. Judicial quiescence in the intervening years has made clear that
this signal was quite accurate.
Federal coal-leasing law has changed only slightly since the 1980s.76 The
circumstances that caused serious problems at that time and in the previous
century are still very much intact. This brief look at coal leasing suggests that
certain difficulties inhere in the disposition of large-scale public resources or, at
the very least, originate from a source deeper than any particular provision of
the federal coal laws. Thus, the next Part examines the broader context of
public resource sales, in both history and the present day.
II.
FAIR MARKET VALUE IN NATURAL RESOURCE LAW
One rationale for selling or leasing public assets is obvious: sales produce
instant revenue. Prior to the imposition of the federal income tax, sales of
70. See 4 COGGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 29, §§ 38:1, 38:9 (noting that energy
companies held reserves "as hedges against petroleum depletion"). Additionally, the authors noted that
total federal acreage under lease soared in the 1950s and 1960s while actual production on federal land
declined. Id § 38:7.
71. In 1976, only about sixty of 533 outstanding coal leases on federal land were in
production. Id § 38:12 n.20 (citing Solicitor's Opinion, M-36951 (1985)).
72. Pub. L. No. 94-377 (1976) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (2012)).
73. See 4 COGGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 29, § 38:50-51.
74. See id § 38:20; Gulley, supra note 31, at 745.
75. See 4 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 29, § 38:26.
76. Minor changes were made by, for example, the inaptly named Coal Market Competition
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-463 (2000) (increasing the maximum coal lease acreage that any single
coal producer could hold within a single state).
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public lands were an important source of revenue for the federal government.77
During the twentieth century, sales of coal, oil, and natural gas netted federal
and state governments billions of dollars that were crucial in funding important
initiatives. In recent years, budget difficulties at every level of government
have raised the profile of asset sales again.78
Given the soaring federal debt, one might expect lawmakers of all stripes
to prioritize the goal of maximizing federal revenue from resource sales. But
longstanding strands of federal resource law cut in the opposite direction. For a
lengthy period in our nation's history, federal policy made land available to
settlers and resource users at little or no cost.7 Sometimes this "policy" was
simply the tacit acknowledgment that he federal government lacked the
manpower, administrative capacity, and political support to police the
settlement, use, and abuse of the public domain, let alone to demand greater
sums. But there were also philosophical reasons. Lawmakers in the
Jeffersonian tradition sought to sow in the West the seeds of republicanism and
agrarianism, imagining a society built around small family farms.8' Giving
away land and resources encouraged westward expansion, settlement, and
development. Many regarded public lands not as protected reserves, as they are
often considered today, but as lands open to all for almost any conceivable
use.82 Even today, though attitudes toward public lands have shifted toward
conservation (and the remaining public lands have long since been closed to
settlement), there remain plausible arguments for selling or providing access to
certain federal resources at below-market prices.
This Part explores these arguments by offering a look at several chapters
in the development of American natural resource policies, with particular
77. Gary M. Anderson & Dolores T. Martin, The Public Domain and Nineteenth Century
Transfer Policy, 6 CATO J. 905, 905 (1987) (noting that proceeds from the sale of public lands
constituted a major revenue source for the federal government until at least the Civil War).
78. Ellen Dannin, Crumbling Infrastructure, Crumbling Democracy: Infrastructure
Privatization Contracts and Their Effects on State and Local Governance, 6 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y
47, 51 (2011).
79. See generally PAUL WALLACE GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT
219-47 (1968); MALCOLM ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS: THE SETTLEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS, 1789-1837 (1968).
80. For a creative, theoretical treatment addressing the legal effects of federal impotence
against "intentional lawbreaking" in the settlement of public lands, see Eduardo Pefialver & Sonia K.
Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1105-13 (2006) (describing the political context
of squatting on public lands during the nineteenth century).
81. GATES, supra note 79, at 62 (noting President Jefferson's devotion to "agrarian
democracy" and quoting Jefferson's famous statement hat "[t]he small land holders are the most
precious part of a state"). As to republicanism, see Carol Rose, Claiming While Complaining on the
Federal Public Lands: A Problem for Public Property or a Special Case?-A Comment on Bruce
Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, GEO. L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2015)
(noting that "small-r republican" impulses propelled the disposal of public lands). Electoral politics
and the politics of slavery indisputably shaped frontier policy as well.
82. See Bruce R. Huber, The Durability ofPrivate Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J.
991, 997 (2014) (describing the "open access" model of natural resource management).
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attention to the price sought by federal officials in resource transactions, the
laws governing public resource sales, and the context in which these laws were
enacted and implemented.
A. Early Public Land and Resource Transfers
For a number of decades, the federal government's natural resource policy
consisted almost entirely in the transfer of public land into private ownership.
The United States had acquired a great deal of land via cessions from the
former colonies and purchases from foreign powers, such as the Louisiana
Purchase.84 Land transfers served two principal goals. The first was fiscal: the
central government was mired in debt following the Revolutionary War and
83. Private entities misprice assets too, of course, but when government does o, public
resources are at stake and public interests are implicated. Voluminous literatures in disciplines ranging
from economics to sociology analyze in rich detail the establishment and attributes of prices in various
contexts within modem market economies. While these literatures tend to be highly specialized, useful
overviews may be found in ASKING ABOUT PRICES: A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING PRICE
STICKINESS (Alan S. Blinder et al. eds., 1998); JACK HIRSHLEIFER, AMIHAl GLAZER & DAVID
HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS: DECISIONS, MARKETS, AND INFORMATION (7th
ed. 2005).
Although the discussion thus far has focused on the government as a seller, it is worth noting
that government may scarcely fare better as a buyer. For example, volume purchases often bestow
agencies with propitious bargaining power, but procurement rules can impair officials' ability to
negotiate on price. Legislation creating Medicare Part D, a federal prescription drug benefit, famously
prohibits the federal government from intervening in negotiations between subsidized health insurers
and pharmaceutical manufacturers. Robert Pear, Power Shift in Congress Revives Health Care Debate,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/washington/02health.html. Other
rules, such as domestic purchase requirements, also may impact purchase price. See, e.g., Laura
Petrecca, U.S. Flags at Military Bases Must be 100% American-Made, USA TODAY (Feb. 22, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/22/american-made-flags-military/5725165
(reporting new Department of Defense purchase rules requiring that "flags purchased by the military
must be wholly sourced from the U.S. [sic]"). Furthermore, tax benefits, such as those granted for
conservation easements, raise the same general question: Are taxpayers getting their money's worth?
In the case of conservation easements, landowners, in return for a commitment to conserve land,
receive tax credits that have been criticized as gratuitous and regressive insofar as they benefit wealthy
owners who had no intention to develop their property. See I.R.C. § 170(h) (2015); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-14 (2009); Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tax Expenditure: In Search of
Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 15-18 (2012) (detailing criticisms of conservation
easement ax incentives); Jeff Pidot, Conservation Easement Reform: As Maine Goes Should the
Nation Follow?, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (2011) (noting that "the public is rightfully
interested in knowing that its financial stake yields durable public benefits," and proceeding to
evaluate recent easement reform legislation in Maine).
On the other hand, in the eminent domain context, there is reason to believe that governments
actually pay above-market prices during pre-condemnation proceedings to avoid the expense
associated with formal litigation. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent
Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 126-36 (2006).
84. See generally GATES, supra note 79, at 49-57, 75-86 (1968) (providing a historical
account of cessions and other federal land acquisitions). The Louisiana Purchase is the most well
known of these acquisitions. These transactions, of course, disregarded entirely the indigenous
occupants of the purchased land. In the seminal case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823), one of the disputants traced his land title to a purchase from a Native American tribe; the Court
deemed this title inferior to a land patent issued later by the federal government.
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had few reliable sources of revenue. The second was the settlement of the
frontier.86 The combination of these objectives posed several questions. How
should land sales be conducted, and at what price? Should the federal
government extend credit to purchasers? Should the mode of sale favor bulk
sales to speculators as intermediaries, or piecemeal sales to settlers? The young
government's efforts to address these questions reveal difficulties in resource
management and disposition that remain quite relevant today.
In the early stages of the transfer process, the federal aim was to
87maximize short-term revenue. Federal lawmakers faced a debt crisis: the
national debt was over a quarter of the gross domestic product, a level it would
not reach again until the Civil War.88 Indebtedness exerted a strong pull in
early debates over public land policy. Even Thomas Jefferson, otherwise an
earnest supporter of giving frontier land away to settlers, came to see federal
land as an important source of revenue.89 The predominance of the revenue
objective is unmistakable in the template for formal public land transactions
established by early land laws, including the Ordinance of 1785,90 the great
Northwest Ordinance of 1787,91 and the Land Acts of 1796 and 1800.92 These
statutes established that land parcels would be sold by auction with a minimum
price fixed by legislation. The government first set the minimum price at two
dollars per acre, a price several multiples above the sale price in several recent
85. Indeed, it was hoped by some that public land sales could be the cornerstone of early
government fiscal policy. See, e.g., DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 252 (2007) (noting John Quincy Adam's hope that
public land sales would "eventually generate enough money for the federal government to run all its
programs ... without having to take anything from the people in taxes").
86. See HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 1-f6 (describing the interplay between the objectives of
revenue and settlement). Settlement was pursued not only in the interest of national expansion but also
in the interest of national defense. The nineteenth-century frontier was rife with conflict with Native
Americans, and settlement was regarded as a natural defense against attack.
87. Id.
88. See Matt Phillips, The Long Story of US. Debt, from 1790 to 2011, in I Little Chart,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/11/the-long-story-of-
us-debt-from-1790-to-2011-in-1-little-chart/265185. U.S. public debt was 29.6 percent of GDP in
1790 and was quickly reduced to below 10 percent, where it remained until the 1860s.
89. Of the strategy of charging a relatively high price for land in sales to settlers, Jefferson had
once said, "By selling land you will disgust [settlers] and cause an avulsion of them from the common
union. They will settle the lands in spite of everybody." HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 4.
90. An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Disposing of Lands in the Western Territory
(May 20, 1785), 28 J. CONT'L CONG. 375, 378 (1933).
91. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States, North-West of the
River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 (1787) (reaffirmed Aug. 7, 1798) (also known as the Freedom
Ordinance or the Ordinance of 1787).
92. Id at ch. 29, 1 Stat. 464; 2 Stat. 73-78.
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sales.9 3 The high price and the auction mechanism, it was assumed, would
serve to maximize federal revenue.94
Some legislators also endorsed a high per-acre price as a discouragement
to speculators, who were widely regarded as opportunists standing in the way
of settlement.95 By interposing themselves in the process of land transfer,
speculators not only skimmed away what would otherwise be public revenue,
but also delayed actual settlement by postponing sales until prices rose.96 Thus
Congress sought to structure public land sales so as to discourage speculation.
Beyond the two-dollar-per-acre price, 97 the size of tracts offered for sale was
the principal deterrent. In general, Congress chose to auction small, 160-acre
tracts of land-a size appealing to settlers-rather than quarter-township tracts
that settlers could not easily afford.98
The decision to subdivide land into 160-acre tracts, however, fed into a
growing administrative crisis. Land could not be sold until it was surveyed.99
The federal survey process, laborious and expensive under the best of
circumstances, would now need to create a grid of accurate lines, spaced half a
mile apart, across the entire frontier.00 Larger tract sizes would have required
many fewer lines and thus a fraction of the effort. In addition, Congress
economized by opening only a small number of regional land offices, which
compelled many prospective buyers to travel long distances to purchase
land.101 This inconvenience, aggravated by the exceedingly slow pace of the
93. HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 64. The two-dollar price was for land purchased on credit; full
cash payment at the time of purchase resulted in an 8 percent discount, subsequently increased to 16
percent.
94. See ROHRBOUGH, supra note 79, at 46 (noting that these elements were designed so that
"the highest possible profit would go to the government").
95. See RICHARD WHITE, "IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN": A NEW
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 140-42 (1991).
96. Id.
97. HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 64 ("Speculation, always a subject of apprehension, it was
held, could not thrive at this particular time in Ohio, since land was already selling at four to six
dollars, a price too high to be attractive to the land jobber."); see also ROHRBOUGH, supra note 79, at
18 (noting that the purchase price was "substantial for the small purchaser").
98. HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 61 (describing the belief that only settlers would be interested
in small tracts). Throughout the period of westward expansion, restrictions on tract size were used to
discourage speculation. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 79, at 187 (noting the acreage limitations that
appeared in a great deal of public lands legislation). Survey townships are square in shape and six
miles to a side; a quarter township is thus three miles to a side or nine square miles, an area of 5,760
acres. GATES, supra note 79, at 44; HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 36-37.
99. Only in 1880 did Congress relax the requirement that only surveyed land could be legally
settled. WHITE, supra note 95, at 143.
100. See ROHRBOUGH, supra note 79, at 34-45 (describing the numerous difficulties associated
with the survey process); see also Vernon Carstensen, Patterns on the American Land, 18 PUBLIUS 31
(1988) (describing some of the social and economic consequences of the rectangular land survey).
101. Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury and the official charged with superintending
the public lands in the very early 1800s, "intended that the land business should be conducted in
accordance with strict Republican principles of administration-that is to say, with a minimum of staff
and the smallest expense possible." ROHRBOUGH, supra note 79, at 38.
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land survey, led thousands of settlers, many of whom were already frustrated
by the high price of federal land, to settle land ahead of the advancing
survey.102 Before long, the large number of squatters made an ameliorative
policy a political necessity. Congress, lacking both the political will and the
official personnel to evict squatters, had no choice but to ratify their
occupation. Congress did this via various preemption laws that gave squatters
the right to purchase, at the minimum price set by Congress, land that they had
improved and resided on for a short period.0 3
In theory, public auctions would harness competition among settlers and
assure the federal government a maximum return. In practice, at a floor price of
two dollars an acre, much land simply went unsold or sold at minimum price.
According to eminent public lands historian Paul Wallace Gates:
These early auction sales . . . , it was thought, might . .. bring to the
government substantially more than the minimum price of $2 an acre.
They did no such thing in these early years. The land sold for the
minimum price and, except for a few exciting auctions at a later date,
this was generally true throughout the history of the public domain.104
Furthermore, many settlers who did purchase land did so on credit from the
United States and later defaulted on their loans.05 By 1820, defaults had
become so problematic that Congress disallowed credit sales entirely and
lowered the base price of land to $1.25 per acre.106 Even at this price, however,
settlers found ways to avoid competition. Competition among themselves, they
quickly realized, would only send their hard-earned money to Washington and
away from the frontier economy. It did not take a great deal of sophistication to
outwit the federal land office. The following tactic is illustrative:
If, upon comparing numbers, it appears that two [settlers] are after the
same tract of land, one asks the other what he will take to not bid
against him. If neither will consent to be bought off, they then retire,
and cast lots, and the lucky one enters the tract at Congress' price-
$1.25 per acre-and the other enters the second choice on his list.'o7
Moreover, the slow pace and inflexibility of the public land sale process
encouraged not only trespass but also resource theft. Timberlands in
Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, and other northern states were denuded at an
102. Id. at 14-16; HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 57; GATES, supra note 79, at 219-21.
103. RoHRBOUGH, supra note 79, at 200-20. Federal land records do not distinguish between
land sold at auction and land acquired by preemption, so we cannot know the extent of the squatting
problem, but it is clear that it was sizeable. What statistics exist can be found in GATES, supra note 79,
at 222-47.
104. GATES, supra note 79, at 133.
105. Id. at 134-36.
106. Id. at 141 (describing the Act of April 24, 1820, 3 Stat. 566).
107. Id. at 152 (quoting SANDFORD C. Cox, RECOLLECTIONS OF THE EARLY SETTLEMENT OF
THE WABASH VALLEY 17-18 (1860)).
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alarming pace in clear violation of federal law. 08 Unlike land in and south of
the Ohio Valley, which often had to be cleared of timber to be made suitable
for agriculture,109 many of the northern timberlands had little residual
agricultural value after timber was cleared.'10 Thus timber theft left the land
office with parcels that were difficult to sell."' The scale of the timber theft
problem was occasionally brought to Congress's attention, but legislators either
regarded the federal government as functionally impotent to solve the problem
or were persuaded by northerners not to invest in expanded enforcement
efforts.112
In the same way, private individuals freely removed minerals from federal
land without paying any form of compensation to the government. The
California Gold Rush took place on federal land, and federal officials decided
early on not to collect a royalty on gold or other valuable minerals.1 13 Needless
to say, in the case of both timber and gold, the value of the resources vastly
exceeded the $1.25-per-acre asking price. Even a law-abiding claimant, then,
could obtain good title to abundant resources for a trifle, and many
corporations took advantage of this expedient to acquire substantial resource
holdings."14 In spite of this, not until the late 1800s did Congress make an effort
108. A brief and sobering account of federal ineffectiveness in the face of timber depredations
can be found in Lucile Kane, Federal Protection ofPublic Timber in the Upper Great Lake States, in
THE PUBLIC LANDS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 439-48 (Vernon Carstensen
ed., 1962). Hibbard described the enforcement of timber laws as "pitifully inadequate due to lack of a
sufficient staff and funds." HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 460; see also GATES, supra note 79, at 534-52.
109. See HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 457 (noting that "forests were a liability rather than an
asset to the early pioneer agricultural settlers").
I 10. As Richard White colorfully puts it, "In Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota awesome
pine forests grew on lands that, once put under the plow, only yielded crops of misery." WHITE, supra
note 95, at 148; see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN, 1836-1915, at 13 (1964).
111. "Once cut for their most valuable timber, [the Lake States forest lands] were usually
allowed to revert to the government for unpaid taxes. Thus, the practical though uncalculated outcome
was as if the United States had leased or licensed the land for logging without any of the stipulations a
prudent lessor might fix to preserve the long-term productivity of the forest. ... [T]his history attested
the momentum of official and popular favor for giving large rein to private will in using land." JAMES
WILLARD HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY: DIFFERENT MODES OF
BARGAINING AMONG INTERESTS 26 (1982).
112. HIBBARD, supra note 65, at 457-63; GATES, supra note 79, at 538-39. Not until 1878 did
an Interior Secretary make it a federal priority to reduce timber theft by way of a more aggressive
enforcement campaign. Id. at 545-50.
113. The Army Colonel nearest the gold fields, tasked with evaluating how the federal
government might assert its rights, wisely declared: "[U]pon considering the large extent of the
country, the character of the people engaged, and the small scattered force at my command, I resolved
not to interfere." COGGINS ET AL., supra note 21, at 112. Many of the Colonel's troops simply deserted
to join the gold hunt themselves.
114. Legal historian James Willard Hurst writes: "Throughout most of the [nineteenth] century
the national and state governments sold their land with no adequate regard to the special resources in
soils, minerals, or timber which might make particular tracts of extraordinary value ... [f[rom this
source arose an important new branch of rentier wealth for investment in industry as well as
agriculture." JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH
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to classify lands by the resources they held and to set their prices
accordingly. 115
Notice, then, how difficult it was for the federal government to derive
revenue from resource sales. The law did not yet require a market value return,
and revenues were far below expectations. By mid-century, officials no longer
regarded public land and resources as a principal basis of federal revenue.
Resource policy was characterized by the inability of federal law to organize
effectively the processes of settlement and resource exploitation.' First and
foremost, the young federal government lacked the administrative and
enforcement apparatus to keep pace with developments on the frontier. Pricing
was crude and administrative capacity was severely limited. Genuine
competitive bidding on land parcels was uncommon, and land auctions failed to
generate the expected revenue. Trespass and resource theft were rampant,
reflecting the reality that, at the level of any individual parcel, the local
resource user-whether acting alone or in conspiracy with others-was a deft
and shrewd counterparty to the clumsy federal landowner.
In the abstract, one might assume that federal lawmakers could have
simply reformed the administration of public lands to deal with these problems.
But such a notion is risible in light of the government's actual bureaucratic
capabilities at the time. The administrative state as we think of it today was a
century away. However fervent the hope that land sales would yield substantial
federal revenue, that hope proved unattainable amidst the land scramble taking
place across the continent.
B. Changes of the Progressive Era
As the nineteenth century progressed, lawmakers scaled back their
revenue aspirations and sought principally to facilitate peaceful settlement of
the public domain. Federal law moved to further enable the private acquisition
of federal land and resources. The signal development was the Homestead Act
of 1862, which transferred millions of acres into the hands of settlers in return
for, in essence, the sweat of their brow." 7 The General Mining Law of 1872
granted the discoverer royalty-free title to minerals on federal land.11s These
laws and many others were marked by a striking disregard for the effects of
CENTURY UNITED STATES 79 (1956); see also WITE, supra note 95, at 148 (describing the
aggregation of wealth in timber companies).
115. See, e.g., Timber and Stone Act of 1878, 45th Cong., Sess. 2, ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89. Several
earlier land laws did apply to specific classes of land, such as land containing salt deposits, but these
did not approach general attempts at land classification.
116. In fact, most public land histories focus on the extralegal disposition of public land rather
than on legal processes, because they more accurately capture the realities of frontier land acquisition.
See, e.g., GATES, supra note 79, at 161-65, 219-21; WITE, supra note 95, at 148.
117. Pub. L. No. 37-64 (May 20, 1862), 12 Stat. 392. For a history of the Homestead Act, see
GATES, supra note 79, at 387-434.
118. Act of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2012)).
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resource disposal on the public fisc. The dominant idea concerning the public
lands was that they ought be dispensed in the service of the people on the
frontier.119
This laissez-faire approach to land disposition added fuel to the run on
public resources. As a result, some have referred to this late-century era as
"The Great Barbecue"-a period in which public lands and natural resources
were exploited and wasted in unprecedented fashion.12 0 As a consequence of
this period, the twentieth century began with new concerns about scarcity in
certain natural resources. Some spoke of "timber famine"l21 and "coal
famine,"l22 terms that would have been almost unimaginable decades earlier.
Against this backdrop, the Progressive Era brought about something of a
revolution in natural resource policy. Facing a depleted resource base, the
federal government began to retain and manage its land and resources, rather
than dispose of them.123 Active management of millions of acres of land
required enormous new administrative institutions, and the establishment of
such institutions, then as now, was not without conflict.124 The mid-1900s
cemented a sweeping federal role in land management. The legal regimes that
took shape during this period, though highly variant across the principal public
resources, tended to allow or even require land agencies to charge a higher
119. The principal resistance to this idea came from the eastern states, which felt that their
resources were being given away for very little in return. But this opposition did not materialize into
anything like a fair market value policy. See generally GATES, supra note 79, at 1-32.
120. Historian Vernon Parrington coined the phrase. It referred not only to wanton resource
exploitation, but also to the inequality of the Gilded Age. VERNON LOUIS PARRINGTON, MAIN
CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN LITERATURE FROM THE
BEGINNINGS TO 1920, at 23 (1927). Parrington used the image of the barbeque but noted that not all
were invited to the feast. "[I]nconspicuous persons, those who were at home on the farm or at work in
the mills and offices were overlooked; a good many indeed out of the total number of the American
people. But all the important persons, leading bankers and promoters and business men, received
invitations. There wasn't room for everybody and these were presumed to represent he whole." Id
121. CLARY, supra note 20, at 12; WILLIAM G. ROBBINS, AMERICAN FORESTRY: A HISTORY
OF NATIONAL, STATE, & PRIVATE COOPERATION 1 (1985); see also United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696, 705 (1978) (noting that "[i]n the mid and late 1800's, many of the forests on the public
domain were ravaged and the fear arose that the forest lands might soon disappear, leaving the United
States with a shortage both of timber and of watersheds with which to encourage stream flows while
preventing floods").
122. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 868 (1999).
123. See generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (2d ed. 1999). The idea of a shift in policy
away from land disposal and toward retention, as presented by, for example, ROY M. ROBBINS, OUR
LANDED HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 1776-1936 (1942), masks substantial variation among the
resource laws of the time. An important corrective is found in Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax,
Fragmentation of Public Domain Law & Policy: An Alternative to the "Shift-to-Retention" Thesis, 39
NAT. RESOURCES J. 649 (1999) (focusing instead on the fragmentation of federal land policies).
124. The United States Forest Service, for example, was formally launched in 1905; the
National Park Service in 1916; and the Bureau of Fisheries (now the Fish and Wildlife Service) in
1903. Stories about the political battles early in the Park Service's history are recounted in HORACE M.
ALBRIGHT & MARIAN ALBRIGHT SCHENK, CREATING THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: THE MISSING
YEARS (1999); see also HAYS, supra note 123.
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price for resource use than previously expected.125 Although the pursuit of
revenue was not the primary impetus for these changes, there was a clear shift
in federal policy away from the relatively unfettered disposal practices of the
late 1800s. Yet despite a broad reordering in the law of and public sentiment
toward public lands, there remained great difficulties in converting resource
abundance into federal revenue.
Two factors drove the renewed effort to secure revenue from resource
sales. First, the federal government needed additional revenue to finance
improved resource management. Conservationists, an important part of the
Progressive constituency, urged federal lawmakers to implement managerial
practices that would preserve and protect the fast-disappearing base of public
natural resources.126 Active resource management, however, required funding
to build and staff organizations capable of overseeing enormous federal
landholdings. Lawmakers thus sought to impose fee requirements even for
activities that had long been unrestricted on federal lands, such as livestock
grazing.127 The goal was cost recovery: fee requirements were not intended to
raise general revenue but merely to recoup expenditures made for resource
management programs.128 Slowly, the elements of a new model of resource
policy crystallized. The federal government retained land ownership in most
circumstances, granting use rights according to a permit system and requiring
users to promptly develop any resources they purchased or leased. These users
owed the federal government "a fee approximately equal to that paid to owners
of private lands." 29
This last requirement points to the second factor: federal resource
transactions increasingly involved commodities for which a comparable private
market existed.130 As long as the West was awash in open land, there was no
private counterpart to the public domain. There were private land sales, of
course, but it is more accurate to say that federal land law shaped the private
125. E.g., Act of June 4, 1897 (authorizing federal regulations on forest lands, including higher
timber fees); see also HAYS, supra note 123, at 46.
126. See generally HAYS, supra note 123.
127. Id. at 45. Besides grazing, other targets for revenue included timber and hydropower
companies. Some lawmakers wished to use revenue secured from fees for rights-of-way granted to
water power companies to pay for other multiple-purpose resource development programs, but dam
owners and many of their congressional representatives disfavored this cross-subsidization. See id. at
79-81, 114-15, 119-20.
128. New and increased fees nonetheless stirred up considerable hostility. Graziers in particular
were entrenched in their opposition and held sway with legislators well-placed to stave off adverse
developments. See id. at 49-65; see also E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
184-90(1942).
129. HAYS, supra note 123, at 71. Hays wrote of the Teddy Roosevelt administration that "the
administration applied [three] basic conditions-a limited permit, prompt use, and a user fee-to all
resources on the public lands." Id.
130. Land, coal, and timber, for example, were widely available on private markets. For a




market than vice versa.'31 But as commodity values rose, and buyers valued
land according to the commodities it held, it became plausible for lawmakers to
require market values for commodity sales. Indeed, it became odd for
lawmakers to seek anything less than market value. Timber on federal lands,
for example, was indistinguishable from timber on private lands, for which
there was an established market. Teddy Roosevelt's first Interior Secretary,
Ethan Hitchcock, remarked:
If the fast disappearing timber of the country is worth $100 at the
stump, why let it go at $2.50 per acre, under the Timber and Stone
Act? Why should the best possible land for agricultural purposes,
which is none too abundant, be sold under the Homestead Law for
$1.25 per acre, while the same land, under competitive "sealed-bid"
bidding can and has been made to bring over $12.00 per acre ... ?13
The existence of private markets enabled critics and policy makers to argue for
greater returns for taxpayers on asset sales. Roosevelt's administration, in
particular, frequently articulated the idea that public resources deserved market
returns.133
Importantly, commercial resource users in many cases favored reform
efforts and the growth of federal management, even if they entailed new fees
and higher resource prices. Regulated resource access brought fees, but with
those fees came stabilized access to public land, new barriers to competition,
and elevated profit margins.'34 Richard White notes that the "majority of large
stock raisers welcomed the chance to end unregulated competition for land and
to gain some legally defensible rights."'35 Large timber companies appreciated
that the Forest Service, "by restricting previously open access to public timber,
seemed to offer an opportunity to overcome the industry's problem of chronic
131. Id. at l6-20.
132. Hon. Ethan A. Hitchcock, Former Sec'y of the Interior, Fraud Stimulated by Land Laws,
Address Before the Commercial Club of Chicago (Dec. 14, 1907), in 9 MAXWELL'S TALISMAN 8
(1908). Hitchcock's remedy? "I would urge the immediate repeal of the Timber and Stone Act, the
Desert Land Act and especially the eighth section of the homestead law, by resorting to all of which
the grossest frauds have been, and are being perpetrated, as was shown by my last annual report for the
fiscal year ending June 30th, 1906. . . ." Id
133. HAYS, supra note 123, at 82-83 (noting the administration's efforts to sell publicly owned
coal at market prices), 184 (describing the argument of Gifford Pinchot, Roosevelt's chief forester, that
private companies "should pay for what they get" from public lands).
134. These concerns were particularly dominant in the case of the timber industry, which had
long suffered from boom-and-bust cycles associated with timber depletion in discrete forests. Local
sawmills and dependent populations suffered the consequences of this structural industry
homelessness. As odd as it seems from today's vantage point, organized timber interests made
common cause with conservation advocates in the early 1900s. WHITE, supra note 95, at 406-09.
Generations later, economists refined the "economic theory of regulation," which held as its central
premise, contra the conventional view of regulation as publicly oriented, that industries often seek
regulation to dull competitive forces. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971).
135. WHITE, supra note 95, at 408.
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overproduction."'36 The emerging conservation movement did not seek to
forbid the commercial use of public resources, as we might assume of
conservationists today in many contexts. Instead, early proponents of
conservation sought to minimize waste and promote orderly and sustainable
development-aims that could, in the long run, assist extractive industries
rather than harm them.137
At the same time, incumbent resource users exerted sufficient influence to
guarantee that fees and resource prices would remain advantageous. Cattle
ranchers, for example, succeeded not only in securing long-term grazing rights
that dislocated nomadic sheepherders with whom they had long competed; they
also succeeded in keeping grazing fees quite low, as compared to commercial
rates. Ranchers and their home-state politicians kept their federal overseers
powerful enough to be of help against competitors, but too weak to increase
fees or restrict their resource usage.139 Public land histories attest to the
difficulty that land agencies had in the early- to mid-1900s in policing the new
legal restrictions on resource access on the public lands. Gates notes that by the
late 1940s, "Grazing supervision and trespass control were 'limited' . . . . As a
result of a staff inadequate to enforce [grazing] regulations some stockmen
'willfully grazed excess numbers' of cattle or sheep, knowing that they were
safe in so doing."l40
In the main, even a substantial shift in the direction of public land law did
not seriously disrupt the power of incumbent resource users. Established
resource economies rapidly accommodated themselves to new federal controls
and used them to their advantage. When Congress wrote new resource law, it
reflected the disproportionate influence of legislators from the western states.141
And although the general trend was toward higher prices for public resources-
the government cancelled several resource sales because the price was too
136. Id. at 409.
137. HAYS, supra note 123. The entire Hays volume develops this premise against the
conventional notion that conservation was generally in opposition to extractive enterprise. See
WILLIAM G. ROBBINS, supra note 121, at 25 (noting that "the lumber industry provides the classic
example of industrial influence in shaping conservation policy").
138. GATES, supra note 79, at 615, 617 (noting the various grazing fees, as well as the
allocation of grazing rights). For a detailed account of the allocation of grazing rights, see LEIGH
RAYMOND, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PUBLIC RESOURCES: EQUITY AND PROPERTY ALLOCATION IN
MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 109-52 (2003).
139. See GATES, supra note 79, at 617-22.
140. Id. at 622.
141. One indicator of western state leverage is the degree to which resource fees paid to federal
agencies are returned to the states. Legislation in 1920 regarding oil leasing and water power sites
allocated half of fee receipts to the federal reclamation fund, which was used to finance water projects
principally in the arid sections of the West, and three-fourths of the remainder directly to states
containing the leased lands. The general treasury received only one-eighth of those fees. Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920 § 35 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 191 (2012)).
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low 142 -legislators and administrators encountered great difficulty in adjusting
the on-the-ground practices of federal resource agents. Resource sale programs
were plagued by administrative difficulties and undercut by political
opposition. For the most part, these programs remained out of public view and
therefore reform efforts were absent from the congressional agenda. Many
resource users succeeded in retaining relatively unfettered, and relatively
costless, access to the public domain.
C. The Fair Market Value Requirement Today
The land management problems characteristic of the early 1800s and early
1900s were, to some degree, a product of their times. But they also point to the
difficulties inherent in the very task of large-scale resource management. The
American experience during these periods demonstrates that converting natural
resource reserves into cash is a substantial administrative challenge, plagued
continually by the advantage enjoyed by existing resource interests. Even
though government today is much larger, much more technically sophisticated,
and better equipped to deal with administrative complications, the problems of
the past are helpful in focusing our attention today.
To be sure, natural resource law today is a far cry from its precursors in
the 1800s or 1900s. A staggering set of reforms-some procedural, some
substantive-have fundamentally changed the way federal land management
agencies conduct their business. Most obviously, the project of land disposal is
decisively over. It is federal policy to retain the remaining public lands.143 But,
more importantly, Congress has redirected the major resource agencies in
important ways. Sweeping changes in federal environmental law, highlighted
by major enactments during the 1970s, have had substantial implications for
public land management.144 Agencies now manage the vast federal public lands
under a complex statutory framework that essentially zones the public lands for
142. Gulley, supra note 31, at 743 (noting President Theodore Roosevelt's suspension of
several coal lease sales for this reason).
143. The formal right of entry offered by the Homestead Act was officially terminated by the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, which declared an official federal policy that "the
public lands be retained in Federal ownership." 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (2012). Over 630 million
acres-some 27 percent of the land area of the United States-remains in federal ownership; in
addition, the federal government manages another fifty-eight million acres of mineral estate beneath
non-federal surface lands. See generally KRISTINA ALEXANDER & Ross W. GORTE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL34267, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE
HISTORY OF ACQUISITION, DISPOSAL, AND RETENTION (2007); Ross W. GORTE ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA (2012). Land swaps
and sales still occur on a regular basis, but the aggregate acreage is relatively small. See GORTE ET AL.,
supra, at 15-16 (noting that, excluding Alaska, federal land ownership actually increased by some
93,000 acres in the eleven western states between 1990 and 2010).
144. See generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004)
(describing the comprehensive history of the development of environmental law, particularly how the
resilience of the environmental community has prevented retrenchment of key environmental
policies).
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various uses; some lands are preserved as wilderness or parks, while others are
devoted to multiple uses.145 Agencies are tasked with comprehensive new
planning requirements,146 overhauled environmental review processes,147 and
new substantive mandates requiring protection of endangered species, air, and
water.148 Agency processes are increasingly open to public scrutiny and
involvement. New administrative law doctrines have created opportunities for
outsiders to goad courts into policing the administration of public resources,
and in so doing have brought increasing judicial oversight to bear on agency
decision making. 49 Although these reforms were generally tangent to the
pricing of federally owned natural resources, resource prices have nonetheless
been a focal point of concern. so
This Section examines the arena of federal land and resource policy as it
stands today, with an eye toward the pricing of land and resources offered for
sale or lease to private parties.5 1 In the first place, natural resource law does
not always require agencies to obtain market value in resource sales-far from
it.152 The following paragraphs survey some of these cases. For example,
statutory grazing fees on public lands are a fraction of those charged for their
145. The Wilderness Act, for example, created a process whereby Congress may designate
wilderness areas with tight constraints on land use. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012). Other statutes created
national parks, monuments, and so forth, each with various use limitations. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-
460zzz (2012). The national forests and lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management are
subject to "multiple-use" mandates that require the corresponding agencies to manage these lands for a
mix of uses. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(c), 1712(a) (2012). Some analysts argue that, in effect, the
multiple-use mandate results in a zoning process "with particular areas being managed for some
dominant uses." COGGINS ET AL., supra note 21, at 658 n.4.
146. Comprehensive management plans are required of every federal land management agency.
Planning processes are generally dictated by agency-specific legislation such as the National Forest
Management Act, whose planning provisions are at 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012).
147. Environmental review requirements stem primarily from the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (2012), which requires a relatively transparent, publicly oriented
process and public dissemination of final documents.
148. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2012); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1274 (2012).
149. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (expanding traditional standing
doctrine); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (giving rise to the so-
called "hard look" doctrine ofjudicial review).
150. For example, resource pricing was a principal focus of reforms to the coal leasing process
enacted in the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083, Aug. 4.
1976.
151. Of greatest policy significance are the vast resources contained on federal land-coal, oil,
natural gas, timber, and various metals and minerals-that are regularly sold by federal agencies.
Comprehensive statistics about sales of many of these resources can be found at the website of the
Office of Natural Resource Revenue. OFFICE OF NAT. REs. REVENUE, DEP'T OF INTERIOR (Oct. 6,
2015), www.onrr.gov.
152. See I COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 29, § 1:23 (describing a trend "in the direction
of a fair market value standard for sales or grants of commodity public natural resources," but noting




equivalent on private land.153 Moreover, mining companies, even foreign ones,
can acquire gold, copper, and other exceedingly valuable commodities on
federal land, royalty-free.154 The subsequent paragraphs explore several cases
in which federal law explicitly requires fair market value, yet agencies have
difficulty carrying out this mandate.
1. Cases In Which Federal Law Does Not Require Fair Market Value
The federal law of public lands took a major turn in 1976 with the passage
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).' Reform had
been in the air for some time: the same spirit that animated Earth Day, and the
wave of environmental legislation that followed, also catalyzed a hard look at
Congress's natural resource policies.156 In a marked departure from early
public land law, FLPMA declared it "the policy of the United States [to] ...
receive fair market value of the use of the public lands and their resources
unless otherwise provided for by statute."'57 The word "unless" has proven
weighty, for Congress has left substantial areas of natural resource law
untouched by the fair market value policy.
Some of these areas are obvious. "Use" of public lands, as defined by
FLPMA,158 includes a rafting trip on the Klamath River in California, a hike
through the Grand Staircase in Utah, or a bike ride on the Potomac Heritage
National Scenic Trail in Maryland. For many recreational uses of public lands,
Congress has simply allowed open access. For many other uses, use fees are
collected, but in these instances, there is little inquiry into "market" value.159
Selecting the appropriate user fee is a contentious issue that has much more to
153. See CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21232, GRAZING FEES:
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 1 (2012).
154. A 2004 study concluded that six of the top ten mining claimants operating on public lands
are foreign-owned. Allison Freeman, Multinational Firms Hold Title to .2M Acres of US. Public
Lands - Report, GREENWIRE (May 11, 2004), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/21267
(referencing a report by the Environmental Working Group entitled, Who Owns the West?, that
aggregated data regarding the ownership of mining claims on public lands).
155. Pub. L. No. 94-579 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787 (2012)).
156. Often used to date the birth of the modem environmental movement, the first Earth Day
was held on April 22, 1970. LAZARUS, supra note 144, at 44-54. Public land law reform was spurred
in part by the creation of the Public Land Law Review Commission in 1964, which produced PUB.
LAND L. REV. COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO
THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION (1970).
157. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9) (2012).
158. The statutory definition of "public lands" includes only lands managed by the BLM and
further excludes the outer continental shelf and tribal reservations. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e).
159. Agencies charge use fees for various activities on public lands, ranging from camping fees
and entrance fees to fees for long-term land uses, including rights-of-way. See, e.g., CAROL HARDY
VINCENT, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RL33730, RECREATION FEES UNDER THE FEDERAL LANDS
RECREATION ENHANCEMENT ACT (2010); Randal O'Toole, Improving Incentives for Federal Land
Managers: The Case for Recreation Fees, CATO INST. (June 18, 2013), http://www.cato.org
/publications/policy-analysis/improving-incentives-federal-land-managers-case-recreation-fees.
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do with philosophical issues of access and practical concerns about cost
recovery than with market dynamics.'60
Fair market value is also irrelevant for some commodities. Hardrock
minerals provide the most notable and economically significant example.'61 For
well over a century, federal mining law has allowed mineral prospectors to
acquire property rights in minerals on public lands simply by discovering
them.162 When the federal government implemented this regime in the mid-
1800s, the principal beneficiaries were small, independent miners who took on
long odds to challenge the western frontier. In this respect, the mining law
resembles other nineteenth-century resource laws benefiting settlers.163 Today,
however, large mining entities, including many foreign firms, extract far more
minerals from federal lands than small miners.164 The law permits these firms
to acquire enormous mineral deposits royalty-free, in stark contrast to the
arrangements that one would find on private land, state-owned land, or other
countries.165 Many have charged Congress with perpetuating a "giveaway" of
public resources,166 but lawmakers have stubbornly resisted periodic attempts
160. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 21, at 957-59.
161. Hardrock minerals include gold, silver, copper, zinc, and lead, in contrast to softer
minerals such as coal or salt. For a brief discussion of the absence of a fair market value requirement,
see MARC HUMPHRIES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33908, MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS:
HARDROCK MINERALs 6-7 (2008).
162. The General Mining Law of 1872 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 11 (2012)). "Discovery" is a
term of art under the statute with a substantial and complicated interpretive history. See JOHN D.
LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 119-67 (1987).
163. The Mining Law essentially relies on the principle of prior appropriation to allocate
property rights, as did, for example, the Homestead Act and the water law of many western states. In
addition, both the Mining Law and the Homestead Act required the claimant to do more than simply
assert rights. The law required some additional labor, demonstrative of commitment to the land. Id. at
16,56.
164. Regarding the rights of foreign entities to U.S. public lands, see Kari Lydersen, Pacfic
Rim and Beyond: Global Mining, Global Resistance and International Law, 23 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 367, 378 (2012) (noting that foreign firms obtain the same "right to mine" as any U.S.
citizen merely by forming U.S. subsidiaries).
165. Private mineral owners and U.S. states commonly require mining entities to pay a hefty
royalty for the right to mine. See generally AARON M. FLYNN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32813,
HARDROCK MINING: STATE REGULATION (2005) (noting that many states require royalties and rental
payments for hardrock minerals removed from state lands). For example, Montana law requires a
royalty of no less than 5 percent of returns from metalliferous minerals or gems; California law
requires a 10 percent royalty. Id. at 8, 31; see also Lydersen, supra note 164, at 378 (noting that the
General Mining Law "could be considered more subservient o mining companies than the [mining]
laws of many developing countries").
166. In its 1997 report to Congress, President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers wrote
that federal mining policy amounts to a giveaway of publicly owned resources, bestowing "a large
subsidy on private mining companies.... Between May 1994 and September 1996, the Federal
Government was forced by the General Mining Law to give away over $15.3 billion worth of minerals
in return for which taxpayers received only $19,190." U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 217 (1997), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ERP-1997/pdfIERP- 1997.pdf
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to restructure federal mineral policy to require royalty payments or otherwise
change the mining law.1 67
Hardrock mining, though important commercially, involves a relatively
small portion of public lands. By acreage, livestock grazing constitutes the
single largest use of the federal public domain.'6 8 Federal grazing law
authorizes private users to forage on public lands for fees substantially below
their fair market value.169 On lands managed by the Forest Service and the
BLM, which include the vast majority of federal lands available for grazing,
the relevant federal fee formula sets the grazing fee at roughly $1.35 per animal
unit month (AUM).1 70 By contrast, a recent federal report found that the
average monthly grazing fee on private lands in western states was $16.80 per
head, over ten times the prevailing federal fee.171
As with mining royalties, reformers have argued for decades that federal
grazing fees should be raised.172 A study commissioned by Congress during the
1970s formally recommended that grazing fees should collect fair market
value, consistent with the 1976 mandate mentioned above.'73 But grazing fees
have been described as the third rail of western politics; ranchers have
staunchly opposed fees from their initial imposition to the present.174 Attempts
167. See, e.g., LESHY, supra note 162, at 287-312.
168. Livestock grazing occurs on over 250. million acres, an area nearly ten times the size of
Pennsylvania. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 21, at 73 1.
169. Grazing fees are established by the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §
1751ff(2012)).
170. VINCENT, supra note 153, at 1. An AUM is a month's use and occupancy of the range by
one "animal unit": one yearling, one horse, one cow and her calf, or five sheep or goats. Id.
171. Id. at 2 (citing NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CHARTS AND
MAPS, GRAZING FEES: PER HEAD FEE, 17 STATES (2015), http://www.nass.usda.gov/Chartsand-
Maps/GrazingFees/gf hm.asp).
172. See, e.g., Karl N. Arruda & Christopher Watson, The Rise and Fall of Grazing Reform, 32
LAND & WATER L. REV. 413 (1997); Timothy K. Borchers, Reforming Federal Grazing Law: Will
Congress Pass Needed Legislation before the Cows Come Home?, 13 J. LEGIS. 216 (1986); Michelle
M. Campana, Public Lands Grazing Fee Reform: Welfare Cowboys and Rolex Ranchers Wrangling
With the New West, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 403 (2002). Some have gone further and called for an end
to public land grazing altogether. See DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED:
REMOVING LIVESTOCK FROM PUBLIC LANDS TO CONSERVE NATIVE BIODIVERSITY (1999).
173. See supra note 159 and accompanying text; see also COGGINS ET AL., supra note 21, at
752.
174. Eric Pianin, Why Grazing Fees Are the Third Rail of Western Politics, FISCAL TIMES
(May 8, 2014), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/05/08/Why-Grazing-Fees-Are-Third-
Rail-Westem-Politics. Early battles over the Taylor Grazing Act and the imposition of permit and fee
requirements on the public domain are well chronicled in PEFFER, supra note 128, at 184-90; PHILLIP
0. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 171-93
(1960). More recently, opposition to grazing fees was a prominent issue in the recent dispute
concerning Nevada rancher Cliven Bundy. Bundy received widespread coverage in the national media
in April 2014 when his refusal to pay federal grazing fees led to a standoff with federal officials. See
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to bring federal fees into alignment with state and private rates have
consistently failed. 7 5
Critics argue that subsidies for grazing and hardrock mining, products of
an earlier era in public land law, have long outlived their social utility.1 76
Political scientists, legal scholars, and others interested in public lands have
long puzzled over the longevity of these regimes.177 Although there are some
plausible, publicly oriented rationales behind these policies, the most
comprehensive accounts attribute their staying power to the disproportionate
influence of rural and western interests in the American political system.178
This influence, in turn, is often leveraged to defend traditional extractive
industries against reformist campaigns. But at the end of the day, grazing fees
and hardrock royalties are settled matters of longstanding federal legislation,
properly adopted through the legislative process. Many have argued for reform,
but Congress has not (yet) seen fit to change the rules.
2. Cases In Which Federal Law Requires Fair Market Value
Grazing and hardrock mining are two major resource uses on federal
lands. There are other major uses in which federal resource law, in contrast to
the previous examples, makes explicit reference to market value. One
noteworthy case can be found in the law governing federal timber sales. The
federal public lands supply roughly one-fifth of all domestically harvested
timber on an annual basis.1 79 The timber sales process is complex: federal law
permits timber harvests only as part of a comprehensive forest management
175. See VINCENT, supra note 153, at 4-7.
176. See CHARLES WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 18-21 (1993) (identifying the "lords of yesterday" or tenets of nineteenth
century resource law that continue to dominate western resource management despite their incongruity
with contemporary norms).
177. Id.; see also WESLEY CALEF, PRIVATE GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS: STUDIES OF THE
LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT (1960); PAUL J. CULHANE, PUBLIC LAND
POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE FOREST SERVICE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT (1981); Foss, supra note 174; MIKE HUDAK, WESTERN TURF WARS: THE POLITICS
OF PUBLIC LANDS RANCHING (2007); LESHY, supra note 162; CHRISTOPHER McGRORY KLYZA,
WHO CONTROLS PUBLIC LANDS? MINING, FORESTRY, AND GRAZING POLICIES, 1870-1990 (1996);
KAREN R. MERRILL, PUBLIC LANDS AND POLITICAL MEANING: RANCHERS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND
THE PROPERTY BETWEEN THEM (2002); Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public
Lands: Why "Multiple Use " Failed, 18 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 405 (1994).
178. See, e.g., FOSS, supra note 174, at 198-204; Blumm, supra note 177, at 415-29. A
numerically small but vocal group of objectors would argue instead that appropriate public policy
considerations drive the price of federal grazing rights and the extent of federal land ownership
necessarily entails pricing considerations that cannot be meaningfully compared with external markets.
These arguments are summarized well in VINCENT, supra note 153, at 2, 6-7.
179. This figure varies substantially from year to year. As recently as 1990, federal public lands
yielded over twelve billion board feet (bbf) of timber annually. This figure has dropped precipitously
over the last two decades because of endangered species protections, enhanced planning requirements,
and increased imports, especially from Canada. See generally SOC'Y OF AM. FORESTERS, THE STATE
OF AMERICA'S FORESTS (2007).
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plan and only after a thorough environmental review.s The sale price for
timber must be "not less than appraised value," which the Forest Service
interprets as a fair market value standard; '81 sales must be advertised
publicly;'82 and bidding methods must "insure open and fair competition."'83
The requirements aim to maintain a competitive sales process with as many
participants as reasonably possible and with a reserve price that insures that the
government receives a fair return. Yet a scratch beneath the surface reveals
crucial differences between the federal sales process and comparable private
sales. Perhaps most strikingly, sales of timber on federal land allow the
purchaser to deduct the cost of building permanent roads on the theory that
such roads remain in public ownership and benefit the public after timber
harvesting is complete.1 84 The convention in private timber sales, however, is
for purchasers to bear all road construction costs.18 Thus a more accurate fair
market price for public timber would include road construction costs, which
can be substantial.186
Furthermore, although the law requires a competitive sales process, the
degree of competition is limited in practice. In the words of former BLM chief
Marion Clawson:
[S]omething quite different than classic economic competition exists
for federal timber. The number of bidders is often small . . . . At the
most there will be several bidders, but not the large number that
economic theory postulates for pure competition . . .. Collusion among
potential buyers has often been suspected and has been proved in a few
cases-although it is typically very difficult to prove. When one
processor repeatedly bids for timber in one federal area but not in an
adjacent one, and his possible rival repeatedly bids for timber in a
second area but not in the first, suspicions of collusion naturally arise.
But there may not be outright collusion in the legal sense; there may
simply be an "understanding"-that is, if you'll keep out of my area,
180. See 3 COGGINS & GLICKMAN, supra note 29, § 34:22 (2007).
181. 16 U.S.C. § 472a(a) (2012); see also 36 C.F.R. § 223.60 (2012) ("The objective of Forest
Service timber appraisals i to determine fair market value.").
182. 16 U.S.C. § 472a(d).
183. 16 U.S.C. § 472a(e)(1)(a).
184. 36 C.F.R. § 223.62 (2012) (authorizing a "purchaser credit" for road construction when
"such construction is accomplished by purchaser"). Critics contend that the Forest Service has
exaggerated the public benefits arising from roads built for timber harvesting. See generally Marc C.
Phares, Below-Cost Timber Sales: Perspective Based on Thirty Years of Environmental Legislation,
12 PuB. LAND L. REV. 59, 66 (1991).
185. See, e.g., Barbara Daniels, Darren McAvoy & Michael Kuhns, Preparing a Timber Sale
Contract, UTAH FOREST FACTS (May 2012), http://extension.usu.edu/files/publications/publication
/NRFF 013.pdf (containing a sample, commonly used contract that places the costs of locating,
restoring, and closing roads on the timber purchaser).
186. See Phares, supra note 184, at 63 (noting that road construction costs are not only a
substantial portion of timber sales but a substantial portion of the Forest Service's budget overall).
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I'll keep out of yours.187
Clawson also recognized that the federal government's timber reserves are so
extensive that, for all intents and purposes, its timber sales policy establishes
the market price. "Far more important than deficiencies in the competitive
process," he wrote, is the fact that the price of federal timber "is a function of
the volume of timber offered."188
Another set of examples involves Forest Service leases of public land to
commercial ski resorts. Over 130 ski resorts, including many of the nation's
largest and busiest, are at least partially situated on public lands.1 89 Under the
National Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 1986, these resorts must pay a fee
"based on fair market value in accordance with applicable aw."190 Much easier
said than done: for many years prior to 1986, and in many of the years since,
ski resort permit fees have been criticized as falling far below fair market
value. When federal investigators concluded in 1993 that the Forest Service
was giving away its land at a steep discount,191 the Service responded with a
lengthy exploration of options for fee assessment.19 2 As a result, in 1996
Congress enacted a complicated formula that was intended to yield an
approximation of the fair market value of the public lands at issue.193 But in
187. MARION CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LANDS REVISITED 81 (1983). Surprising as it may
seem, little has changed since the publication of Clawson's comments. The structure of the timber
sales process is virtually unchanged; if anything, competition is even less intense today due to
expanded environmental responsibilities for timber buyers.
188. Id. at 81-82.
189. Ski Area Permit Fee System, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,097 (proposed July 13, 1995) (noting that
over 120 ski areas are located within the 155 national forests). These resorts account for nearly 60
percent of the skiing done in the United States. Mike Soraghan, Report Rips Ski-Resort Fees: Leases
on Public Land Too Cheap, Critics Say, DENVER POST, Jan. 20, 2003, at Al. For an engaging account
of some of the political battles that arise in connection with ski resorts' use of public lands, see
MICHAEL W. CHILDERS, COLORADO POWDER KEG: SKI RESORTS AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT (2012); see also James Briggs, Ski Resorts and the National Forests: Rethinking Forest
Service Management Practices for Recreational Use, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79 (2000).
190. The National Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-522 (Oct. 22, 1986)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 497b (2012)). The quoted provision is 16 U.S.C. § 497b(b)(8).
191. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-107, FOREST SERVICE: LITTLE
ASSURANCE THAT FAIR MARKET VALUE FEES ARE COLLECTED FROM SKI AREAS (1993). For a
subsequent report of greater breadth, see U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-16, U.S.
FOREST SERVICE: FEES FOR RECREATION SPECIAL-USE PERMITS Do NOT REFLECT FAIR MARKET
VALUE (1996).
192. See USDA FOREST SERV., SKI US, YOUR NATIONAL FORESTS: FAIR MARKET VALUE OF
THE USE OF NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LANDS BY SKI AREAS 2-5 (2002) (recounting the efforts
made by the Forest Service following the 1986 Act and the 1993 GAO report to develop a new
method for determining ski resort permit fees).
193. This formula was contained in Section 701 of the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands
Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-333 (Nov. 12, 1996). The statute provides that:
The ski area permit rental charge (SAPRC) shall be calculated by adding the permittee's
gross revenues from lift ticket/year-round ski area use pass sales plus revenue from ski
school operations (LT SS) and multiplying such total by the slope transport feet percentage
(STFP) on National Forest System land. That amount shall be increased by the gross year-
round revenue from ancillary facilities (GRAF) physically located on national forest land,
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2002 the Forest Service concluded that the results of the 1996 revision were
inconclusive at best, and the change had likely decreased federal receipts.1 9 4
Critics continue to blast the Forest Service for its fee structure.'95 The principal
criticism (aside from the general complaint that receipts are too low) is that the
fee structure, presently calculated on the basis of various resort revenue
streams, fails to account for other revenue streams that are augmented by the
use of public lands.196 Real estate development adjacent to ski resorts, for
example, is an enormous moneymaker.197 At present, however, revenue from
home and condominium sales, resort hotels, and restaurants is not included in
the Forest Service's fee assessment.
But critics would do well to pause before casting stones.198 A more
sympathetic assessment of the Forest Service's efforts to collect fair market
value would recognize the nearly insuperable difficulties that arise when trying
to calculate appropriate fees. To begin, it is nigh impossible to determine what
fraction of a resort's revenues is attributable to its operations on public lands.
Moreover, the public lands used by ski resorts are, in many respects, one of a
kind.199 Few, if any, private landowners hold parcels in desirable mountainous
including all permittee or subpermittee lodging, food service, rental shops, parking and
other ancillary operations, to determine the adjusted gross revenue (AGR) subject to the
permit rental charge. The final rental charge shall be calculated by multiplying the AGR by
the following percentages for each revenue bracket and adding the total for each revenue
bracket:
(A) 1.5 percent of all adjusted gross revenue below $3,000,000;
(B) 2.5 percent for adjusted gross revenue between $3,000,000 and $15,000,000;
(C) 2.75 percent for adjusted gross revenue between $15,000,000 and $50,000,000;
and
(D) 4.0 percent for the amount of adjusted gross revenue that exceeds $50,000,000.
Utilizing the abbreviations indicated in this subsection the ski area permit fee (SAPF)
formula can be simply illustrated as:
SAPF = ((LT SS) STFP) GRAF = AGR; AGR % BRACKETS
16 U.S.C. § 497c(b)(1) (2012).
194. USDA FOREST SERV., supra note 192, at 10-13; see also Soraghan, supra note 189 ("A
report released this month by the Forest Service says the congressional 'fix' made more than six years
ago to address the [fair market value] problem actually made it worse.").
195. See, e.g., Scott Condon, Public Lands Provide Big Benefits to Skico, Skiers, ASPEN TIMES,
(Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20111205/NEWS/I 11209935; Paul Rogers, Forest
Service to Review Rents Paid By Ski Resorts, TRIBUNE Bus. NEWS (Jan. 10, 2003),
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1GI-96323120.html; Paul Rogers, Cold Cash: Ski Resorts Profit on
Cheap US. Land, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 8, 2002), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lGl-
120472260.html. But see SE GROUP, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SKI AREAS ASSOCIATION (2002)
(presenting an analysis concluding that "the 1996 Ski Area Permit Fee System is providing a fair
market value rental to the United States").
196. See Condon, supra note 195 (noting that the statutory formula incorporates revenues from
facilities on national forest land, but it "doesn't take into account the benefits that a ski area operator
reaps on private lands from use of adjacent public lands").
197. Id.
198. See Soraghan, supra note 189 ("Although auditors have regularly scolded the Forest
Service for not establishing fair market value, they haven't suggested what it should be.").
199. See USDA FOREST SERV., supra note 192, at 5--6 (noting the difficulties of identifying
comparable private lands and transactions).
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terrain with the size and topography required to sustain a ski resort. Thus, the
lack of a pre-existing market in ski resort terrain makes valuation difficult, as
nearly every valuation technique requires comparable transactions.201
Furthermore, a permit to operate a ski resort on public lands is not a complete
202
fee interest in property; it is more akin to a lease2. The United States reserves
many rights and the permit is revocable under certain conditions.203 The
property right at issue, therefore, is not comparable to outright ownership.
Difficulties of this sort recur in many different public resource situations.
A final example: federal land management agencies are authorized, in
certain circumstances, to buy and sell land or swap federal land for private or
204state-owned land. There are many reasons why this authority is desirable and
useful for land managers. Real estate transactions may help consolidate federal
landholdings, eliminate awkward private inholdings, raise revenue, facilitate
prudent municipal development, enhance natural or scenic values, or
accomplish other managerial objectives. In particular, land ownership
adjustment is a constant matter of concern where federal lands are intermingled
with nonfederal lands. This is the case across millions of acres in the American
West, most obviously where early disposal patterns granted land to railroads
and states in a checkerboard pattern.205
Under current federal law, land management agencies may sell or swap
lands only (a) when doing so is in the public interest, (b) after appraisal, and (c)
206
for fair market value. Yet despite these legal requirements, federal land
transactions are routinely criticized for undervaluing federal lands and
enriching private entities at the expense of the general public.207 Land
200. Id.
201. Id. at 5-7. This Forest Service report identifies three basic methodologies that could be
employed to determine the market value of public lands used for ski resorts: the sales comparison
method, ground rent capitalization method, and land residual value method. All three methods rely
heavily on comparable sales. The report notes at several points that these methods are "less useful
when sales of comparable properties are scarce."
202. See SE GROUP, supra note 195, at ii ("The rights of a ski area operator utilizing National
Forest System lands . .. differ significantly from those of a ski area operator utilizing lease lands.").
203. Id.; see also GEORGE H. SIEHL, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., U.S. FOREST SERVICE PERMITS
FOR OPERATION OF SKI AREAS ON NATIONAL FORESTS (1985) (discussing, inter alia, the types of
conditions imposed on special-use permits of the sort utilized by ski resorts).
204. See generally 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 29, § 13.
205. See generally SuSAN CULP & JOE MARLOW, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, A FAIR
TRADE: OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE LAND TENURE ADJUSTMENT
PROCESS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THE WEST (2012).
206. 43 U.S.C. § 1713(d); 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 29, § 13:23. The Forest
Service has other statutory exchange authority as well, including the Weeks Act of 1911, ch. 186, § 7,
36 Stat. 962 (1911) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 516), and the General Exchange Act of 1922,
ch. 105, § 1, 42 Stat. 465 (1922) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 485). Each of these provisions
authorizes the Service to exchange public land for private land or timber.
207. See, e.g., GEORGE DRAFFAN & JANINE BLAELOCH, WESTERN LAND EXCHANGE
PROJECT, COMMONS OR COMMODITY? THE DILEMMA OF FEDERAL LAND EXCHANGES (2000);
Deborah Nelson et al., Government Land Trades Leave Questions About How Public Fared, SEATTLE
TIMES (Sept. 27, 1998, 12:57 PM), http://old.seattletimes.com/special/landswap/partl/lcorp 092
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transactions are the subject of numerous investigations, reviews, and audits.208
In one particularly egregious case, a federal inquiry revealed that a private
party purchased a parcel of federal land appraised at $763,000 and sold it on
the very same day for $4.6 million. 2 09
Of course, when development bumps up against federally owned lands,
there is no reason that the federal government should refuse to consider
divestiture. Public land development may be more sensible in many cases than
development into other areas. The point is not that federal land transactions
should not benefit private developers; the point, rather, is that law requires such
transactions to reflect the fair market value of the land, yet the government's
procedures to achieve this end are often inadequate.210
Though federal land deals are sometimes corrupted by fraud, collusion, or
self-dealing,2 11 these problems are not unique to land management agencies.
More relevant to this Article is the structure of the land sale and exchange
process and the administration of the land deal "agenda." The nuts and bolts of
the land sale and exchange processes give the distinct impression that the
agencies are acting at the behest of private interests, rather than in the public
interest.
On the face of the law, the BLM's authority to sell its land is limited; the
Bureau is to retain land unless the planning process determines that selling the
land "will serve the national interest."212 Yet although the law contemplates
that federal agencies will initiate federal land transactions in furtherance of the
agency's mission, private real estate developers have instigated many recent
798.html (noting a number of instances in which the public "came up short" in federal land
exchanges).
208. For a summary of investigations relating to land exchanges in particular, see Appendix 11,
in U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-61 1, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: BLM AND
THE FOREST SERVICE HAVE IMPROVED OVERSIGHT OF THE LAND EXCHANGE PROCESS, BUT
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED 74-75 (2009) [hereinafter GAO 2009 REPORT].
209. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-73, BLM AND THE FOREST
SERVICE: LAND EXCHANGES NEED TO REFLECT APPROPRIATE VALUE AND SERVE THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 19 (2000) [hereinafter GAO 2000 REPORT]. This GAO report contains a number of
eyebrow-raising vignettes. See, e.g., id at 16-27.
210. Id. at 4 (concluding that the federal land management agencies, during the period of the
GAO's investigation, "did not ensure that the land being exchanged was appropriately valued" and
"have given more than fair market value for nonfederal land they acquired and accepted less than fair
market value for federal land they conveyed").
211. See, e.g., Dennis Wagner, Arizona's Ex-Rep. Rick Renzi Gets 3-Year Prison Term, USA
TODAY (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/28/rick-renzi-arizona-
prison-sentence/3288937 (former member of Congress sentenced on numerous counts, including
extortion, in connection with a federal land swap conducted in collusion with a business partner).
There is a long and storied history of legislators self-dealing in public lands. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. 87 (1810) (dealing with the infamous Yazoo land fraud, in which Georgia legislators accepted
bribes and agreed to sell state land to speculators at low prices).
212. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (2012).
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transfers. Thus, many transactions involving the public lands are proposed
initially not by the federal government as the result of a forward-looking
214
management program, but by external, private land interests2. Because land
management agencies are cash-strapped, they have limited capacity to process
proposed exchanges correctly.215 Motivated third-party facilitators, who may
have a speculative interest in affected lands, steer the land transfer agenda to a
216substantial degree2. Lacking a national strategy, land management agencies
are more likely to be drawn to an agenda created and nurtured by private
interests.
Even when outsiders initiate land sales proposals, land management
agencies have tools that could assure the public a fair return. A suitable
auction, for example, would, in the real estate context, probably yield a more
217
accurate fair market value determination than an appraisal. But despite the
default requirement that agencies conduct sales by competitive bidding, the
BLM has decided to use formal competitive bidding procedures only when
,,18property is "urbanizing. Furthermore, Congress can evade its own general
prophylactic provisions by legislating transactions directly, creating sui generis
provisions for any given exchange.2 19 One analysis concluded that recent land
exchanges "bespeak a renewed commitment to commercial development. They
are almost nothing like [earlier] transactions that cleaned up boundaries or
eliminated inholder problems. Instead, they are . . . driven as much by the
desire to free land for development as by conservation."220
213. DRAFFAN & BLAELOCH, supra note 207, at 20-35. Some have noted that another, less
direct form of transfer occurs when private entities purchase land on the wildland-urban interface from
the U.S. Forest Service and then rely on the Forest Service to provide fire protection for their homes.
Forest Service land sales and exchanges often involve lands in the wildland-urban interface, where
forest fires are common. Federal firefighting expenses have grown dramatically in recent years, in part
due to the increased expenditures associated with protecting development on former National Forest
land. See Scott K. Miller, Missing the Forest and the Trees: Lost Opportunities for Federal Land
Exchanges, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 197 (2013).
214. See DRAFFAN & BLAELOCH, supra note 207, at 15-22.
215. The BLM has recently and aptly described itself as "very stretched." Phil Taylor, 'Very
Stretched' BLM Pleads with Appropriators to Approve Inspection Fees, E&E NEWS (June 20, 2014),
http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/stories/1060001659/print.
216. See GAO 2000 REPORT, supra note 209, at 20-25.
217. The appraisal process has been roundly criticized by federal investigators. Id. at 16-19.
218. 43 C.F.R. § 2710.0-6(c)(3)(i) (2012).
219. Twenty of the 250 land exchanges processed by the BLM and the USFS between October
1, 2004, and June 30, 2008, were specifically legislated by Congress. GAO 2009 REPORT, supra note
208, at 22. The particularized legislation that authorizes these transactions often includes directives
strikingly different from the default procedures outlined in federal law. Id. at 28.
220. SALLY K. FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE: THE LIMITS OF LAND ACQUISITION AS A





Part I confirms that the difficulties plaguing federal coal leasing are not
limited to coal. Seldom have federal resource managers sold resources into
private markets for a full market price. Although it is difficult to generalize,
several strands bind these accounts together. Above all, incumbent resource
users hold a strong position in the American political and legal system relative
to federal land managers. Agencies are constrained by their task environment,
including the enormity of their landholdings, the diversity of their legal
mandates, and chronic shortfalls in funding. The law's reference to "fair market
value" has proven insufficient to compel judicial intervention. To the extent
that establishing stable, market-based revenue from resource sales is a principal
objective of natural resource law, a better way forward is required. An
improved approach would specify resource sales procedures that enhance
competition when maximizing revenue is the goal.
A. Oddities of the Public Resource Marketplace
Resource sales are more likely to yield fair market value if there is an
active private market for assets substantially similar to those being sold by a
government.221 A parallel private market facilitates a fair return for government
managers in several ways. First, it allows government managers to discern the
market value of the goods at issue with relative ease. Their estimates may draw
on a larger set of "comps"7-values from completed, comparable transactions-
222than would otherwise be available. Moreover, an external market makes it
more likely not only that there exists a sufficiently numerous pool of potential
buyers for government assets, but also that managers will know how to go
about identifying that pool and providing notice of upcoming sales. Finally, by
providing a transparent flow of pricing information, an adjacent market enables
supervisors and outsiders to hold government agents accountable for obtaining
fair value.
But for many public resources, an external market reference point is a
chimera. As previously noted, many of the resources sold by government actors
(whether in the context of natural resources or not) are sui generis and therefore
no comparable external market exists.223 The extent of federal land ownership
221. In a trivial sense, this statement verges on tautology, for only an existing market could
produce a market value. But there is a market for unique goods and assets, however limited. Securing a
fair return, as this Section will explain, generally involves opening or "priming" that market as much
as reasonably possible.
222. Reliance on comparables is typical in numerous contexts, including home sales. See, e.g.,
Jay Romano, Your Home; Market vs. Appraisal: What the Real Value?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/08/realestate/your-home-market-vs-appraisal-what-s-the-real-
value.html.
223. To say that assets are unique is not to say that there is no market for them, only that
particularized goods rather than say, commodities, define the market. Although commodity markets
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is such that, for many resources, public supplies virtually constitute the market;
there is no externally determined market price.224 This was true, for example,
of land, coal, and timber for much of the 1800s. Today, the natural resources
that remain in public ownership are often unique not only in their extent but in
their substance and physical attributes, as well as in the applicability of various
legal restrictions. Sales of natural resources often have regulatory strings
attached. There may be environmental review obligations or reclamation
commitments that must be certified prior to the sale of these goods.225 Such
processes often mean that the actual transfer of ownership may take much
longer, and may ultimately be less certain, than in comparable private
transactions.226 These features make valuation extraordinarily complex.227 The
absence of a parallel trade of similar assets in private ownership makes the
value determination far more difficult. 228
When public resource managers are bound to a fair market value standard
by law, yet lack a parallel private market from which to readily derive values,
can be monitored instantaneously, the valuation of unique goods is profoundly challenging. See
generally LUCIEN KARPIK, VALUING THE UNIQUE: THE ECONOMICS OF SINGULARITIES (2010).
Difficulties inhere even for sellers not committed to maximizing revenue, as may be the case with
federal agencies; simply getting a price in the ballpark may itself be a difficult task. For purposes of
my argument, it suffices merely to point out that, in such instances, there is no external market referent
for government managers to consult for "off-the-shelf' pricing information.
224. In such markets, price is inextricably tied to the government's decision to sell a resource in
a particular quantity. For example, commentators have noted that federal decisions to lease en masse
offshore tracts for oil and gas drilling virtually guaranteed that "much oil and gas will go essentially
for free." George Cameron Coggins, The Public Interest in Public Land Law: A Commentary on the
Policies of Secretary Watt, 4 PUB. LAND L. REv. 1, 5 n.38 (1983). Coggins also noted a similar
phenomenon in the case of federally owned coal: because massive quantities were sold "into a soft
market" in the early 1980s, coal was "vertually [sic] being given away for a few cents a ton." Id.
225. Federal asset sales are commonly subject to the environmental review procedures
mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). Reclamation is
required for, inter alia, sales of surface coal. See the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
226. A recent report by the Inspector General of the Department of the Interior, for example,
found that processing times for onshore oil and gas drilling permits on federal lands were excessive.
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CR-EV-MOA-0003-2013,
ONSHORE OIL AND GAS PERMITTING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (2014).
227. There is an enormous literature, spanning multiple disciplines, that deals with problems of
valuation. For an overarching and largely sociological account, see KARPIK, supra note 223. A
collection of more technical discussions may be found in THE WORTH OF GOODS: VALUATION AND
PRICING IN THE ECONOMY (Jens Beckert & Patrik Asperse eds., 2011).
228. At the same time, the mere fact that a comparable private market exists does not guarantee
that federal law will require fair market value for resource sales of that kind. In some instances,
lawmakers have elected to offer public resources for sale at a substantial discount for political or
public policy reasons. Many would place federal grazing rights into this category: an external market
exists in that private landowners (as well as state and local governments) offer grazing rights to local
ranchers at prices far in excess of federal grazing fees, yet lawmakers have steadfastly refused to raise
those fees, evidently for private political or public policy reasons. See supra Part II.C.1; see also
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 166, at 217 ("Public grazing fees are almost
always below private fees and may not even cover the government's cost of administering the grazing
program.").
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regulators generally have two approaches to solve this problem. The first
approach is to create or simulate a market environment by stimulating
competition for the resource; this is generally accomplished by way of an
auction. The second approach is informed appraisal. In these instances, federal
officials rely on valuation experts who gather information about the asset to be
sold and sales of analogous assets elsewhere to discern a reasonable asking
22923price. These two approaches are sometimes combined.230
Both methods are associated with significant difficulties. The examples
furnished in this Article suggest that several related problems are likely to
arise. Part II.A demonstrated that auctions and similar competitive sales
processes might result in questionable outcomes if competition is inadequate.
Incumbent users of public resources tend to succeed in tailoring the resource
acquisition process to suit their interests. Coal and timber buyers, for example,
not unlike colluding land buyers in the nineteenth century, know how to
suppress competitive pressures. Without the disciplining function of a parallel
market, public resource managers, whether intentionally or not, may fail to
resist attempts by incumbents to structure the terms and procedures of resource
sales according to their private benefit.231
Appraisal processes are plagued with difficulties as well, due to both the
unique nature of many federal resources and the limited scope of agencies'
232valuation processes. Public land managers stand at an informational
disadvantage relative to private claimants. Whether because resource buyers
are the sole source of underlying resource data (as in the coal-leasing example)
or because buyers have better knowledge of the true commercial value of the
resource (as in the land sale and swap example), those "on the ground" often
possess information that federal agencies lack. Driven by a profit-oriented
business plan, resource buyers understand the monetary value of public
resources in ways that public entities often neglect. Public officials, by contrast,
can only guess at private business models and thus at the true economic value
of the resources involved. Consequently, there is often a substantial
informational asymmetry between the government seller and the private
buyer.233
229. Law requires appraisals in the context of land sales and swaps. See supra note 206 and
accompanying text.
230. Coal leasing, as we have seen, relies on a competitive bidding process backstopped by the
Interior Secretary's determination of the coal's fair market value. See supra Part I.
231. This does not necessarily imply wrongdoing on the part of the agency. Theories of agency
capture highlight cases in which, over time, regulators come to occupy the same ideational space as the
regulated industry. Without pushback afforded by competitors or detractors, there may be little to stop
this process.
232. Recall the BLM's failure to incorporate export potential in its valuation of coal resources,
the Forest Service's inability to consider ski resorts' full revenue, and both agencies' difficulties
incorporating the real estate development possibilities of public lands in land swaps and sales.
233. Informational asymmetry is commonplace in market transactions of many sorts. See, e.g.,
Mark J. Garmaise & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Confronting Information Asymmetries: Evidence from Real
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Thus, in the absence of a comparable private market, the likelihood that
agencies will obtain fair market value for public resources diminishes. These
problems stem largely from the task environment inhabited by public land and
resource managers relative to resource claimants and beneficiaries. As a
practical matter, public resource managers are situated very differently from
both the buyers with whom they transact and the private sellers of similar
resources. Public land managers, for example, oversee enormous landholdings
and do so subject to legal mandates that emphasize public values. Generally,
they must balance a set of competing objectives; little in their vocational setting
disciplines them toward maximizing returns from resource sales. They may
very well lack sufficient resources to conduct an appropriate valuation. In such
circumstances, officials may be susceptible to external manipulation. Even in
the absence of deliberate wrongdoing, buyers' interests are likely to shape
transactions because managers often lack the incentive or information to push
back against buyers' claims. Recall the case of coal leases: public land
managers rely on buyers' representations about the extent of coal deposits, the
condition of the market, and the operational necessity of tract development.
There is scant incentive for public officials to contest these representations, and
234there is precious little in the law that requires them to do so.
B. Administrative Possibilities and Political Realities
In the setting described above, holding agencies to a fair market value
standard, without more, accomplishes little. Although the standard evokes
purity of process, the premise on which it rests-the existence of a pure market
for the commodity-is in many cases inaccurate.
If Congress systematically seeks to enhance resource revenue while
preserving agencies' traditional land management authority, lawmakers would
do well to abandon reliance on the abstract fair market standard. Congress
should instead specify a set of resource sale procedures and make certain that
agencies have sufficient resources to carry them out. Although operational
details would vary across resource programs,235 the reforms should reflect the
political and practical realities of the natural resource context. Most
importantly, procedural reform ought to account for incumbent resource users
who have an incentive to restrain competition to the best of their ability, and
agencies, given their task environment, that may tend to use flexibility in their
Estate Markets, 17 REV. FIN. STUDS. 405 (2004) (describing the strategies employed to confront
informational asymmetry in the commercial real estate context).
234. In a sales transaction between private entities, both parties typically have a direct personal
stake in the terms of the deal. In the sale of a public resource, the public agent has less "skin in the
game" and less reason to push back against a buyer. The dynamic is similar to a transaction described
earlier, in which private claims to public resources may exceed their legal parameters because land
managers find it difficult and costly to resist claim expansion. See Huber, supra note 82, at 1034-35.
235. Leading commentators have noted that "[1]egal mechanisms for allocating public natural
resources are bewilderingly diverse." See 1 COGGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 29, § 1:23.
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236legal mandate to benefit entrenched incumbents. Genuine, unmanipulated
competition enhances returns in resource sales, reduces the likelihood of
capture, increases accountability, and diminishes the possibility of
favoritism.237
In structuring resource programs according to these realities, Congress
would be wise to cabin agency discretion in regards to variables that affect
competition. Maintaining competitive pressure in asset sales requires more than
simply a competitive process; both the coal and timber sales programs
currently purport to require competitive sales and yet frequently suffer from
inadequate competition.238 Thus lawmakers may need to move beyond general
declarations and consider aspects of resource sales programs that have
previously been the domain of agency specialists. For example, lawmakers may
have to consider the scale of resource development at which competition is
likely to be the most robust. We have seen that the degree of competition in any
particular sales process is often determined at the local level: even given a
vibrant national timber or coal market, only one or two actors may be capable
of bidding on a remote resource asset. Agencies conducting resource sales can
expect pressure from buyers to select a scale at which competition is at its
minimum, just as coal firms commonly propose lease tracts that will be of
interest only to themselves.2 39 If Congress wishes to prevent agencies from
succumbing to such pressure, it may dictate a different scale. In the specific
case of coal, Congress could eliminate or restrict the "lease by application"
process and require that lease sales involve tracts selected by the BLM within
designated coal production regions.
If Congress increases the procedural burdens on land management
agencies to enhance competition, it should also see to it that those agencies
receive appropriations sufficient to carry out such procedures with accuracy
and professionalism. Again, the example of coal sales is instructive. A switch
to the "coal producing region" process would require the BLM to thoroughly
assess the coal reserves in its jurisdiction and to understand both domestic and
international markets for federal coal. Competent implementation of this
process would likely necessitate a substantial infusion of human resources
within the relevant offices of the BLM. There is some reason for concern:
political scientists have shown that, regrettably, members of Congress
sometimes place demands on bureaucrats with little intention of empowering
236. Consider the Interior Department's abandonment of regional coal leasing processes and
willingness to prioritize land sales and swaps proposed by real estate development interests.
237. In the case of coal leasing, for example, the participation of even a second bidder produced
somewhat higher bids than single-bidder auctions. See INSPECTOR GEN. 2013 REPORT, supra note 6,
at 8; GAO 2013 REPORT, supra note 17, at 16-19.
238. As to coal, see 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing the Interior Secretary to award
leases by "competitive bidding"). As to timber, see 16 U.S.C. § 472a(e)(1)(a) (2012) (bidding
processes are to "insure open and fair competition").
239. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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them to meet those demands.240 This enables members of Congress to claim
credit with their constituents for policy changes now, while reaping further
electoral benefits later by blaming agencies for their failure to carry out new
policies. For resource sales, one would hope that Congress would see the
wisdom of investing in agency programs with direct revenue implications.
Ultimately, the objective would be to create a task environment for agency
officials in which their own analytical capacities moderate the endemic
bargaining advantage typically enjoyed by private actors in their negotiations
with resource management agencies.
Obviously, agencies could implement many helpful procedural changes
without congressional intervention. The history of public resource
administration, however, suggests why agencies are unlikely to engage in
reform on their own motion. First, it is worth underscoring that public land
managers are not merely or primarily salespeople. The responsibilities of the
Forest Service and BLM extend far beyond asset sales. These agencies must
develop and maintain expertise in a wide range of areas to fulfill their mandates
regarding ecosystem protection, wildlife monitoring, and wilderness
preservation, among many other areas. Given this, it is not entirely surprising
that agencies seem outmatched in sales transactions against sophisticated
business actors. And it is unlikely that they would suddenly devote scarce
agency resources to resource sales to the detriment of other objectives.241
Secondly, the land management agencies have historically been somewhat
beholden to extractive industry interests: the Forest Service to the timber
industry, for example, and the BLM to the grazing and mining industries.242
Although there have been important reforms in recent years, these agencies are
seldom willing to stake out positions in clear opposition to these industries.243
Of course, neither does the history of public lands lawmaking (let alone
the current state of congressional relations) provide much hope that Congress
240. See MORRIS FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT ch.
5 (2d ed. 1989) (describing the federal bureaucracy as little more than the "whipping boy" of
Congress).
241. In fact, the diversity of the legal mandates that govern the land management agencies is an
interesting point of focus in considering the options for improving resource sales. Federal law gives
these agencies little guidance on how to prioritize various objectives. Resource sales programs
constitute but one category amidst a wide array of management activities, and the law seldom dictates
an overarching objective that might guide agency managers in establishing a management agenda.
Managers are under no command, for example, to manage land so as to maximize revenue from
resource sales.
242. Although such a statement smacks of cynicism, a great deal of careful scholarship by
political scientists, historians, and legal scholars has come to that conclusion. For a generation of
scholars, in fact, these agencies were among those used most commonly as examples of "capture" or
the "iron triangle." See, e.g., FOSS, supra note 174, at 198-204; KLYZA, supra note 177, at 6, 140,
145; Blumm, supra note 177, at 415-22.
243. See generally CLARY, supra note 20, at 195-99; JAMES R. SKILLEN, THE NATION'S
LARGEST LANDLORD: THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 190-93
(2009) (providing a comprehensive history of the BLM).
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will soon take up the task of reforming resource sales procedures. As many
have commented, Congress has done little of note in the realm of natural
244resources law in the last several decades. Even setting aside its current
malaise, Congress has demonstrated negligible interest in bearing down on the
traditional resource interests of the American West.245 The stasis in the law of
mining and grazing, as described earlier, well illustrates the present rough
equilibrium, which has held for many decades now, where lawmakers tinker at
the edges of these policy areas but leave untouched the central elements of the
resource disposition process.
CONCLUSION
Although the law and policy behind the sale of federal natural resources
has changed considerably over time, and even today varies significantly across
different resources, there are several constants. The administration of the
nation's sizable public domain has never been easy-not when the federal
government was young and weak, and not now with a massive federal land
management apparatus. Overseeing hundreds of millions of acres of land,
upholding varied and variable public interests in these lands, and developing
policies that balance general objectives with local circumstances are difficult
goals to achieve under any circumstances. They are even more difficult to
achieve when the government adopts, as it has in recent decades, a proprietary
246approach to public resources. This approach is difficult in part because
private users of public lands, those actually "on the ground," have always had
247substantial leverage against federal land managers. To the extent that
agencies have not sought or received fair market value in public resource
transactions, it is largely due to the difficulty of administering a vast public
domain in the presence of numerous, entrenched, and incumbent private
claimants.
In a pathbreaking 1931 article, economist Harold Hotelling published a
mathematical model explaining how the owner of a nonrenewable resource
could maximize the value of that resource.248 The model, among the most
famous in the field of resource economics, helps to explain how much of the
resource the owner should store and sell in a given year. In other words,
Hotelling's work provided a mathematical answer to the quandary that selling
244. See generally CHRISTOPHER MCGRORY KLYZA & DAVID J. SOUSA, AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, 1990-2006: BEYOND GRIDLOCK 285-96 (rev. ed. 2013).
245. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 176.
246. I have argued previously that federal public lands law and administration has shifted from
an "open access" model to a "proprietary" model, in which the land management agencies serve as
trustees for the public interest, which is, often as not, given effect by securing a fair return from
resource assets. See Huber, supra note 82, at 1031-32 (describing the proprietary model).
247. See id (describing the durability of private claims to public lands as a historical matter).
248. Harold Hotelling, The Economics ofExhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137 (1931).
1558 [Vol. 103:1515
2015] THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES
too little of a resource would yield too little revenue and selling too much could
devalue the resource or deplete it too early.
If only it were so simple. In public resource management, it is seldom the
case that managers are tasked straightforwardly with the goal of maximizing
the monetary value of a given resource. Instead, federal agencies must manage
public lands for multiple and sometimes conflicting purposes. Public land
policies often represent an odd amalgamation of public and private interests.
Although this multiplicity is broadly consistent with democratic governance
(and indeed, it describes almost all public policy), it renders public ownership
distinctly at odds with the models of owner behavior commonly assumed in
theories of property, which generally feature a single-minded, value-
maximizing owner.249 It is just these sorts of owners, in fact, that agencies
encounter across the table in resource transactions.
It is not surprising that public land managers behave differently than
private landowners. More interesting, and more important from a theoretical
standpoint, is the recurrent failure of government institutions to secure fair
market value in the sale or lease of public assets and the corresponding success
of incumbent resource interests in leveraging and extending their transactional
advantage. Apparently, public ownership is far more suited to private benefit
than is commonly understood. This provides a clue to the durability of
widespread public land ownership in the United States, a somewhat unusual
phenomenon in light of the well-known American aversion to state ownership.
Private resource users have more than accommodated themselves to public
ownership regimes; they have, in various ways across our institutional history,
tilted those regimes to suit their particular needs.
249. More generally, property theory has somewhat neglected public property or the property of
the state. See Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 183, 196-98 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (noting, inter alia, that
state property has not been "systematically analyzed" and describing the applicable literature as
"limited"). Harold Demsetz, regarded as a pioneer for his work on the origins of property rights, also
largely ignored state property. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347, 354 (1967) ("I shall not examine in detail the altemative of state ownership.").
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